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INTRODUCTION
Cyberphysical systems—computers that act in and on the 
physical world—are proliferating rapidly. These systems have the 
potential to address some of today’s dangers, deprivations, and 
desires, and to create opportunities unimagined. Occasionally, 
however, they will cause injuries that otherwise would not have 
occurred. The inevitability of injury invites speculation about how 
product liability law will address these cases and impact these 
systems. 
In one sense, this is a problem: “a question raised for inquiry, 
consideration, or solution.”1 It deserves and perhaps demands 
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thoughtful analysis. Descriptively, how are the evolving rules of 
product liability law likely to apply to these systems? Normatively, 
how should they apply? A problem of this kind is to be initially 
“solved,” if at all, through exploration rather than legislation. 
Often, however, the “liability problem” means something 
different. It is an obstacle to be removed, the object of consternation 
rather than contemplation.2 In the case of automated driving systems, 
liability apparently must be “solved” before these systems can be 
deployed to the public.3 On this view, the focus rapidly jumps from 
understanding the problem to enacting the solution.  
Product liability law may pose particular functional challenges 
for the development and deployment of cyberphysical systems. 
Likewise, cyberphysical systems may pose particular functional 
challenges for the operation of product liability law. But neither 
exists to promote the other. Rather, these challenges should be 
identified and evaluated with reference to broader societal goals, 
including safety and welfare. 
This Article focuses on one cyberphysical domain—automated 
driving—to methodically analyze the so-called liability problem. It 
considers how automated driving could affect product liability, how 
product liability could affect automated driving, and how each could 
advance or impede the prevention of injury and the compensation of 
victims. 
The Article concludes that the current product liability regime, 
while imperfect, is probably compatible with the adoption of 
automated driving systems. These systems, when introduced, are 
likely to be substantially safer than human-driven vehicles. Because 
driving decisions will shift from human drivers to automated systems 
(and their designers), a larger share of the crashes that nonetheless 
occur will implicate product liability law. This means that, in 
comparison to the automotive industry today, the automated driving 
industry will likely bear a bigger slice of a smaller pie of total crash 
costs. Under conservative assumptions, these costs are large—but 
not extraordinarily so. 
 1. Problem, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/problem [https://perma.cc/B7KG-WCB6] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016); cf.
Robert D. Hursh, The Products Liability Problem, 27 J. MARKETING 9 (1963). 
 2. See Problem, supra note 1 (“a source of perplexity, distress, or 
vexation”).
 3. See, e.g., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES, NAVIGANT RESEARCH (2013), https:// 
www.navigantresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ASDV-13-Brochure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NRX-ADJH]. 
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Introducing automated driving as a service rather than as a 
product may be a more effective way of passing these costs to the 
motorists who, along with victims and the broader public, already 
pay for the costs of crashes today. Service models such as driverless 
taxis and delivery robots would help consumers avoid paying large 
upfront costs and would provide manufacturers with a flexible 
revenue stream that could help them better manage inevitable 
uncertainty about their liability exposure. 
This analysis is a sketch to be critiqued and completed. It relies 
heavily on numbers that are imprecise and assumptions that are 
arbitrary. The results are presented with a minimum of significant 
digits and should be viewed as order-of-magnitude estimates. 
Experts from other domains and with access to other (likely 
proprietary) data can play an important role in refining these 
estimates. In short, the Article does not claim to be definitive, but it 
does try to be deliberate. 
WHO CARES?
Many people seem to care about the question of liability in the 
context of automated driving. It is the subject of countless news 
articles,4 multiple academic articles,5 and at least two publicly funded 
reports.6 The question of “who is liable” is frequently posed at public 
events, though more recently it has been eclipsed somewhat by 
ruminations on runaway trolleys.7
The public focus on liability may reflect some combination of 
fear and fascination. Perhaps those who wonder about it are 
essentially asking how law can bring order to an uncertain future; or 
perhaps liability is an indirect way of talking about death and 
destruction—a respectable veneer on an evolutionarily useful 
preoccupation with the macabre. Such speculation runs beyond this 
Article. 
 4. See, e.g., GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/#q=autonomous+cars+ 
liability [https://perma.cc/B5XJ-LL59] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (search 
“autonomous cars liability”). 
 5. See infra notes 120, 146, 213, 214, 246, 280. 
 6. See infra notes 17, 293. 
 7. Unfortunately. See Bryant Walker Smith, Slow Down That Runaway 
Ethical Trolley, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y (Jan. 12, 2015, 3:42 PM), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/01/slow-down-runaway-ethical-trolley 
[https://perma.cc/CRU8-U73N]; Bryant Walker Smith, The Trolley and the Pinto: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Automated Driving and Other Cyberphysical Systems, TEX.
A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
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But who should care—and why? Developers and 
manufacturers of automated driving systems should care because 
they will be defendants in injury cases. The lawyers who will litigate 
these cases should also care. Liability should also matter to people 
who will actually be harmed in automated driving crashes and to 
people who could be injured in crashes of any kind. This last 
statement tracks two principal goals of civil liability: compensation 
and safety.8
These goals are common to both vehicular negligence and 
product liability. As used in this Article, vehicular negligence refers 
primarily to personal injury claims against individual motorists or 
their principals, while product liability includes claims against 
companies that allegedly made or sold a defective product.9 This 
Article focuses on the shift from a compensation regime for 
conventional driving that is largely premised on vehicular 
negligence10 to a compensation regime for automated driving that 
increasingly implicates product liability. 
The compensatory function of product liability is intended to 
make victims of product defects whole again by returning them to 
the condition they were in before the relevant injuries. Similarly, tort 
law’s compensatory function is intended to restore victims of 
wrongful acts more generally, including negligent driving. As 
explored below, crashes can impose tremendous costs on those who 
are injured in them. Shifting from a regime premised on vehicular 
negligence to one premised on product liability will advance this 
compensatory function if and only if that shift makes more of these 
costs recoverable. 
The safety function of product liability is intended to 
incentivize manufacturers and consumers to take reasonable safety 
precautions. Ideally, product liability will deter manufacturers from 
selling products that are not reasonably safe without deterring these 
manufacturers from selling useful products that are reasonably safe.11
 8. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for 
Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1919, 1919 (2010); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability,
in Symposium, Products Liability: Litigation Trends on the 10th Anniversary of the 
Third Restatement, 26 REV. LITIG. 1067, 1067 (2007). 
 9. See infra notes 11-14. Product liability can encompass other claims as 
well. 
 10. This also includes states with no-fault crash regimes. 
 11. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 8, at 1919. But see Richard C. 
Ausness, “Danger Is My Business”: The Right to Manufacture Unsafe Products, 67 
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The regime’s actual impacts on safety and innovation, unfortunately, 
are unclear and contested.12 In simplistic terms, some may view 
product liability as a potential impediment to the development and 
adoption of automated driving systems that could save lives, while 
others may view product liability as a tool to ensure that these 
systems are responsibly deployed and continually improved. On 
either view, product liability’s impacts result from a combination of 
exposure to liability and uncertainty about the extent of that 
exposure.13
Liability exposure refers to the actual product liability costs 
that a company will incur. In theory, if a manufacturer can 
confidently predict these costs, then it can pass them onto its 
customers through the prices that it charges. The same is true for the 
insurer to which that manufacturer may turn. In this way, product 
liability helps to internalize some of the costs of injuries. Between 
two otherwise identical products, the safer one should be less 
expensive and hence more attractive to buyers. 
Differences between vehicular negligence and product liability 
could distort the relative economics of automated driving and 
conventional driving.14 Imagine that a conventional vehicle and a 
vehicle with an automated driving system cost the same to actually 
manufacture and market. Further assume, subject to the discussion 
below,15 that the manufacturer’s liability exposure is greater for the 
vehicle with the automated driving system than for the one without. 
In that case, the more advanced vehicle will cost more upfront, even 
if it is substantially safer. 
In this example, the higher purchase price of the vehicle with 
the automated driving system might theoretically be offset by 
increased safety, especially as reflected by lower automotive 
insurance premiums. However, a purchaser may not compare the 
overall cost of ownership. Moreover, to the extent that more crash 
ARK. L. REV. 827, 827 (2014) (explaining how and why product liability law 
sometimes tolerates unsafe products). 
 12. See, e.g., THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON 
SAFETY AND INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
 13. Cf. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort 
Reform, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 540-41 (2011) (discussing “Frank Knight’s 
renowned distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’”). 
 14. See infra notes 118-19, 186-90, 278-83. 
 15. See infra Figure 9. 
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costs are internalized under product liability than under vehicular 
negligence,16 the conventional vehicle may still appear to be cheaper. 
In short, liability exposure could conceivably lead to higher 
prices for automated driving systems, which could lead to slower 
adoption of these systems, which could lead to crash injuries that 
could have been prevented by these systems. 
In contrast to exposure, liability uncertainty refers to lack of 
confidence about the actual product liability costs that a company 
will incur. If an automated driving developer is unable to confidently 
predict its liability costs, it may either delay deployment of its 
system or conservatively price that system to account for the 
possibility of high liability costs. Similarly, insurers may decline to 
cover that developer or the would-be buyers of its system, or they 
may demand higher premiums to do so.  
In those cases, liability uncertainty could lead to slower 
deployment of or higher prices for automated driving systems, which 
could lead to slower adoption of these systems, which could lead to 
crash injuries that could have been prevented by these systems. 
These scenarios are possibilities, not predictions. The majority 
of this Article develops a foundation for evaluating these possibilities 
by examining the relationship of both automated and conventional 
driving to (1) crashes, injuries, and fatalities; (2) the societal cost of 
crashes; (3) the technical failure of vehicles and their components; 
(4) the product liability of developers, manufacturers, and operators; 
and (5) the availability and adoption of products and services. 
One prominent simplifying assumption throughout this analysis 
requires upfront explanation. Many of the numbers that follow 
stipulate or assume 100% automated driving across all vehicles and 
all trips. This assumption is pure fantasy. However, this assumption 
facilitates straightforward comparison with current driving statistics 
without distorting those comparisons. The National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) analysis of the safety benefits of 
vehicle-to-vehicle communication likewise assumed universal 
adoption.17
 16. See infra notes 111-15 (low minimum requirements for third-party 
liability insurance); see also Bryant Walker Smith, How Governments Can Promote 
Automated Driving, 46 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2749375 [https://perma.cc/7D59-V9FB] (discussing 
strategies to internalize the costs of travel). 
 17. JOHN HARDING ET AL., NHTSA., DOT HS 812 014, VEHICLE-TO-
VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS: READINESS OF V2V TECHNOLOGY FOR APPLICATION, at
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In reality, there are multiple pathways to fully automated 
driving, including advanced driver assistance systems that assume an 
increasing share of the driving task, automated emergency 
intervention systems that intervene in increasingly assertive ways, 
and truly driverless systems that operate in increasingly challenging 
environments.18 Each of these systems will need to interact with 
human drivers, bicyclists, pedestrians, and other conventional road 
users. These interactions may be especially challenging, and the 
crashes that result from them will raise particular questions within 
product liability law.19
CRASHES, INJURIES, AND FATALITIES
Two Bay Area families suffered a devastating loss after two mothers and 
their four children were killed in a fiery minivan accident on Interstate 5 
near the community of Gorman in Los Angeles Tuesday morning. 
Officials had to hold back two hysterical fathers from the flames as they 
tried to rescue their family. ABC7 News learned the children were ages 2, 
3, 4 and 5 years old. The minivan was partially in the right-hand lane after 
a minor wreck on Interstate 5 near the community of Gorman, about 65 
miles north of downtown Los Angeles. A semi-truck going about 55 mph 
slammed into the van from behind, sending it off the road and down an 
embankment, where it quickly caught fire, CHP Officer Frank Romero 
said. The two fathers, who were in the driver’s and passenger seats at the 
time of the crash, suffered burns trying to save their wives and four 
children, Romero said.20
This is a recent crash report selected at random. There are 
many more like it because some 35,000 people die on U.S. roads 
every year.21 This is roughly one hundred deaths every day and, as 
many others have observed, equivalent to two large commercial 
airplanes colliding every week.22 Motor vehicle crashes are a leading 
xiv (2014), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/V2V/Readiness-of-V2V-
Technology-for-Application-812014.pdf. 
 18. Walker Smith, supra note 16. 
 19. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. 
 20. Katie Marzullo, 2 Bay Area Mothers, 4 Kids Killed in Fiery Los Angeles 
Crash, ABC 7 NEWS (June 29, 2016), http://abc7news.com/news/2-bay-area-mothers-4-
kids-killed-in-fiery-la-crash/1404831/ [https://perma.cc/69WZ-YAKQ]. 
 21. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATS. & ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 269, EARLY
ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2014 (2015), https://crashstats. 
nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812160 [https://perma.cc/3PRS-XE27] 
[hereinafter 2014 TRAFFIC FATALITIES].  
 22. For reference, a common commercial airplane, the Boeing 747-8, 
carries a maximum of roughly 467 passengers. See BOEING, 747-8 AIRPLANE
CHARACTERISTICS FOR AIRPORT PLANNING 13 (2012), http://www.boeing.com/assets/ 
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cause of death by injury, and for Americans between fifteen and 
twenty-four, the leading cause of death.23 More than 15% of those 
killed in crashes are bicyclists and pedestrians.24
Fatalities are just one measure of the destruction on U.S. 
roads.25 Crashes also injure nearly four million Americans every 
year.26 Approximately six million crashes are reported to the police 
every year,27 and at least as many less severe crashes likely go 
unreported.28
At the same time, roadways are significantly safer than in the 
past. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, crashes annually claimed 
more than 50,000 lives29 even though Americans were cumulatively 
driving less than half the three trillion miles that they currently travel 
each year.30 Fatalities have declined from this peak both in absolute 
pdf/commercial/airports/acaps/747_8.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ2Y-PTEN] (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 23. Motor vehicle crashes account for nearly a quarter of fatalities in this 
age group—more than suicide, homicide, poisoning, or any single medical 
condition. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TEN LEADING CAUSES OF 
DEATH AND INJURY, http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/leadingcauses.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6Z4E-T2CQ] (last updated Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter CDC TEN LEADING 
CAUSES]; Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2013, 64 NAT’L VITAL STATS.
REPS. 1, 84-85 (2016), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MYC3-K32Y] (last visited Nov 16, 2016). 
 24. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATS. & ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 270, 
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, 2014 DATA: PEDESTRIANS 1 (2016), https://crashstats.nhtsa. 
dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812270 [https://perma.cc/LLC9-YHQZ]; NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATS. & ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 151, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS,
2013 DATA: BICYCLISTS AND OTHER CYCLISTS 1 (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa. 
dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812151 [https://perma.cc/YN6M-94EX]. 
 25. There is also a difference between fatal crashes and crash fatalities, 
since a single crash may involve multiple fatalities. Similarly, injury crashes can—
and often do—involve more than one injury. For simplicity, this Article generally 
references fatalities and injuries as well as police-reported crashes. 
 26. LAWRENCE J. BLINCOE ET AL., NHTSA, DOT HS 812 013, THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, 2010 (REVISED), at 1
(2015), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812013.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN4X-FCQC]. 
 27. Id. at 13. 
 28. Id.
 29. ANCESTRY.COM, MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES & FATALITY RATE:
1899-2003, http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~pawashin/military/TrafficFatalities_ 
1899-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8D7-7ZK3] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter 
TRAFFIC FATALITIES].
 30. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., TRAVEL MONITORING ANALYSIS SYSTEM 
(TMAS) HISTORICAL VMT REPORT (2012), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
policyinformation/travel/tvt/history/historicvmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK33-4NGJ] 
[hereinafter HISTORICAL VMT REPORT]. 
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terms and much more dramatically relative to vehicle miles traveled. 
Figure 1 shows this relative change.31
Figure 1 
A focus on fatalities, however, can obscure as much as it can 
reveal. An annual fatality count does not indicate whether, in 
comparison to years past, a vehicle today is less likely to crash (or 
crash severely), the individuals involved are less likely to sustain 
injuries, or those injuries are less likely to be fatal—and, if so, why. 
More recent data on nonfatal crashes, while far from precise or 
consistent, suggest some combination of these factors. Figure 1, for 
example, shows the declines in rates of fatalities, injuries, and police-
reported crashes32 relative to 1994. 
 31. TRAFFIC FATALITIES, supra note 29; HISTORICAL VMT REPORT, supra
note 30. 
 32. While not shown on this graph, the rate of fatal crashes has decreased 
more slowly than the rate of fatalities, and the rate of injury crashes has likewise 
decreased more slowly than the rate of injuries. See supra note 25; NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 246, 2014 MOTOR VEHICLE 
CRASHES: OVERVIEW 2 (2016), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ 
ViewPublication/812246 [https://perma.cc/SGL9-V7DM] (comparing the 
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Historically, improvements in vehicle design have reduced the 
rates of some kinds of crashes and increased the survivability of the 
crashes that nonetheless occur.33 About a dozen automotive safety 
features covered by the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards—
including seatbelts, air bags, and energy-absorbing steering 
assemblies—are estimated to have saved nearly 28,000 lives in 2012 
alone.34
Unfortunately, the current model of individual vehicle 
ownership means that new technologies can take decades to be 
prevalent in the nationwide fleet.35 The average age of a motor 
vehicle is about eleven years.36 If this ownership model persists, then 
electronic stability control, for example, will be in less than 90% of 
registered vehicles until the late 2020s.37 This technology saved over 
1,000 lives in 201238 even though it was then on less than half of all 
registered vehicles.39
Seatbelts are an earlier success story involving both vehicle 
design and occupant behavior. Three-point seatbelts were introduced 
into the United States by Volvo in the early 1960s40 and are now used 
by nearly nine out of ten drivers nationwide (with substantial 
 33. See, e.g., CHARLES J. KAHANE, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 069, LIVES SAVED 
BY VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE 
SAFETY STANDARDS, 1960 TO 2012: PASSENGER CARS AND LTVS (2015), https:// 
crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812069 [https://perma.cc/UJ24-
55N8]. 
 34. Id. at 227. 
 35. See ADRIAN LUND, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY SAFETY:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 53-54 (2016), http://www.iihs.org/media/e79d686a-
514d-4671-84c4-a946200a295b/-1172843725/Presentations/2016_04_03% 
20LifesaversLund_FULLtimeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPJ3-CE59]. 
 36. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TABLE 1-26: AVERAGE AGE OF AUTOMOBILES 
AND TRUCKS IN OPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2016), http://www.rita.dot.gov/ 
bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/tab
le_01_26.html_mfd [https://perma.cc/VRG4-Y3AA]. 
 37. See LUND, supra note 35, at 53-54. 
 38. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 042,
ESTIMATING LIVES SAVED BY ELECTRONIC STABILITY CONTROL, 2008-2012, at 3
(2014), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812042 [https:// 
perma.cc/ RF3Z-PNNC]. 
 39. See LUND, supra note 35, at 54. 
 40. Michelle Krebs, The Man Who Buckled Up the World, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 24, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/24/automobiles/the-man-who-
buckled-up-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/6YH3-4H7N]. 
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variation among the states).41 In 2014, unrestrained occupants 
accounted for only 13% of travelers42 but nearly 50% of fatalities.43
In other words, wearing a seatbelt is one of the best ways to survive a 
crash. 
Driver behavior remains the most significant determinant of 
whether a crash actually occurs.44 (This fact, unfortunately, is often 
lost in news about the latest vehicle defects.)45 Driver error plays a 
role in some 94% of motor vehicle crashes today.46 These errors 
include inattention, distraction, inadequate surveillance, excessive 
speed, incorrect assumptions, misjudgments, illegal maneuvers, 
overcompensation, poor directional control, and simply falling 
asleep.47 Three overlapping factors—alcohol impairment, speeding, 
and driver distraction—are particularly noteworthy. 
In 2014, 31% of roadway fatalities involved alcohol 
impairment.48 In contrast, a roadside survey conducted by NHTSA 
detected illegal levels of alcohol on the breath of 0.4% of drivers 
during weekday daytime hours and 1.5% of drivers during weekend 
 41. See YUAN YAN CHEN, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 149, SEAT BELT USE IN 
2014—USE RATES IN THE STATES AND TERRITORIES (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa. 
dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812149 [https://perma.cc/3BVX-W7AV]. 
 42. Id.
 43. 2014 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES, supra note 32, at 3-4. In 2007, when 
average usage was 82%, about 5,000 people died because they were not properly 
belted. CHEN, supra note 41, at 2; see also NHTSA, DOT HS 811 105, LIVES SAVED
FAQS 13 (2009), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811105 
[https://perma.cc/47L6-2TN3]. 
 44. See SANTOKH SINGH, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 115, CRITICAL REASONS
FOR CRASHES INVESTIGATED IN THE NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION 
SURVEY 1 (2015), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pubs/812115.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
28J3-J8CD]. 
 45. Cf. NHTSA, DOT HS 808 795, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY DEFECTS AND 
RECALLS: WHAT EVERY VEHICLE OWNER SHOULD KNOW (2011), http://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallprocess.cfm [https://perma.cc/7AQQ-Q9PY] (“In 
2009, approximately 30,000 lives were lost on our Nation’s highways. . . . Clearly, 
there is a need for dramatic improvement in motor vehicle safety. Getting unsafe 
vehicles off the road is integral to improving safety and saving lives.”). 
 46. SINGH, supra note 44, at 1; see also Bryant Walker Smith, Human Error 
as a Cause of Vehicle Crashes, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:15 PM), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/12/human-error-cause-vehicle-crashes [https:// 
perma.cc/6H7Y-XR7P]. 
 47. See SINGH, supra note 44, at 2. 
 48. NHTSA, DOT HS 812 219, 2014 CRASH DATA KEY FINDINGS (2015), 
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812219 [https://perma.cc/ 
FXL7-TB8M] [hereinafter 2014 CRASH KEY FINDINGS]. 
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nighttime hours.49 (Approximately 15% of drivers declined to 
provide breath samples.)50 As Figure 3 shows, higher alcohol levels 
are associated (except at very low levels) with significantly higher 
crash probabilities.51 A driver at the legal limit of 0.08% is nearly 
four times more likely to crash than a driver with no detectable 
alcohol, and a driver at twice the legal limit is nearly fourteen times 
more likely to crash. 
Figure 3
 49. AMY BERNING, RICHARD COMPTON & KATHRYN WOCHINGER, NHTSA,
DOT HS 812 118, RESULTS OF THE 2013-2014 NATIONAL ROADSIDE SURVEY OF 
ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE BY DRIVERS 1-2 (2015), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/
nti/pdf/812118-Roadside_Survey_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AJ4-CGY6]. This 
apparently represents a significant decline from previous decades. Id.
 50. Id. at 4. For more discussion of drivers avoiding the test site or refusing 
to be tested, see Robert B. Voas et al., Drinking and Driving in the United States: 
The 1996 National Roadside Survey, 30 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 267, 
267 (1998) (explaining the methodologies of earlier surveys). 
 51. See RICHARD P. COMPTON & AMY BERNING, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 117,
DRUG AND ALCOHOL CRASH RISK 6 (2015), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/ 
812117-Drug_and_Alcohol_Crash_Risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6K7-C836] (using 
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Speeding likely played a role in at least 28% of roadway 
fatalities.52 “NHTSA considers a crash to be speeding-related if the 
driver was charged with a speeding-related offense or if an officer 
indicated that racing, driving too fast for conditions, or exceeding the 
posted speed limit was a contributing factor in the crash.”53 Speeding 
is routine,54 and while it may be merely incidental to some crashes, it 
probably plays an unacknowledged role in far more. Regardless, 
higher speed is both theoretically and empirically associated with 
more severe injury in those crashes that do occur.55
Driver distraction was present in 10% of roadway fatalities.56
Distraction associated with electronic devices is of rising concern.57
Preliminary roadway fatality data for 2015 suggest that fatalities 
increased by approximately 7% over 2014, which is more than twice 
the rate at which vehicle miles traveled increased.58 Notably, as 
 52. 2014 CRASH KEY FINDINGS, supra note 48, at 1. See also NHTSA, DOT
HS 812 021, SPEEDING: 2012 DATA 1, 4 (2014), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/ 
Public/ViewPublication/812021 [hereinafter 2012 SPEEDING].  
 53. 2012 SPEEDING, supra note 52, at 1. 
 54. See KAY FITZPATRICK ET AL., NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, NCHRP REPORT 504, DESIGN SPEED, OPERATING SPEED, AND POSTED 
SPEED PRACTICES 82 (2003), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_rpt_ 
504.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2F9-F6DC]; PAUL SCHROEDER, LIDIA KOSTYNIUK &
MARY MACK, NHTSA, DOT HS 811 865, 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY OF SPEEDING 
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 39 (2013), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ 
communications/pdf/2011_N_Survey_of_Speeding_Attitudes_and_Behaviors_8118
65.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7AH-ZA89]; see also Bryant Walker Smith, Lawyers and 
Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language, in ROBOT LAW 78, 93 (Ryan 
Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016). 
 55. See, e.g., Chris Jurewicz et al., Exploration of Vehicle Impact Speed—
Injury Severity Relationships for Application in Safer Road Design, 14 TRANSP.
RESEARCH PROCEDIA 4247, 4248 (2016); Colleen Peterson et al., Addressing Key 
Concerns Regarding Automated Speed Enforcement via Interactive Survey
(forthcoming 2017) (describing the dangers of speeding); DAVID RICHARDS &
RICHARD CUERDEN, DEPT. FOR TRANSP.: LONDON, ROAD SAFETY WEB PUBLICATION 
NO. 9: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPEED AND CAR DRIVER INJURY SEVERITY 9 
(2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090417002224/http:/www.dft.gov. 
uk/pgr/roadsafety/research/rsrr/theme5/rsrr9.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HGM-WWCQ]; 
DAVID C. RICHARDS, DEPT. OF TRANSP.: LONDON, ROAD SAFETY WEB PUBLICATION 
NO. 16, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPEED AND RISK OF FATAL INJURY: PEDESTRIANS 
AND CAR OCCUPANTS 10 (2010), http://nacto.org/docs/usdg/relationship_between_ 
speed_risk_fatal_injury_pedestrians_and_car_occupants_richards.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
EP4N-V7MP].  
 56. 2014 CRASH KEY FINDINGS, supra note 48, at 1. 
 57. DISTRACTION.GOV, http://www.distraction.gov/ [https://perma.cc/2YLD-
FDH7] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 58. 2014 TRAFFIC FATALITIES, supra note 21, at 1. 
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shown in Figure 2 above, the rate of police-reported crashes began 
trending upward sooner than fatalities and injuries, which would be 
consistent with riskier driving in safer vehicles. 
These factors, and others, are important to understanding the 
future of roadway safety, for which automated driving holds 
tremendous promise. When automated driving systems are 
eventually deployed, they are likely to be significantly safer than 
conventional vehicles for at least five reasons. 
The first reason is practical: Safer performance is likely to be a 
social if not a legal prerequisite to market introduction. In informal 
comments, NHTSA’s administrator has suggested that automated 
driving should be at least twice as safe as conventional driving.59 The 
U.S. Secretary of Transportation, in the context of emphasizing 
safety, has cited a prediction that automated driving could reduce 
fatalities by 80%.60 If these sentiments reflect the eventual 
expectations of regulators, developers, and consumers, then 
automated driving will not be a commercial reality unless and until it 
is in fact safer than conventional driving. (This, of course, does not 
mean that an automated driving system is safer merely because it has 
been introduced.) 
Second, there is hope that automated driving systems will 
reduce crash rates by reducing the opportunity for and impact of 
driver error (more than they increase the opportunity for and impact 
of other kinds of error such as component malfunction). Automated 
driving systems may avoid many of the errors, described above, that 
contribute to some 94% of crashes.61 At a minimum, they will not be 
literally drunk. Moreover, they are unlikely to operate at 
unreasonably high speeds (even if they exceed posted speed limits 
under some circumstances). 
Third, the combination of remote data collection and over-the-
air software updates will allow developers to quickly identify and 
correct some kinds of performance issues. Today’s drivers are 
largely unable to share the situational expertise and locational 
 59. Keith Naughton, Regulator Says Self-Driving Cars Must Be Twice as 
Safe, BLOOMBERG (June 8, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-06-08/u-s-auto-regulator-says-self-driving-cars-must-be-twice-as-safe
[https://perma.cc/4HMH-99B4] (I moderated this panel). 
 60. Pete Bigelow, Anthony Foxx: Coolness Aside, Self-Driving Focus 
Should Be on Safety, CAR & DRIVER (July 20, 2016, 10:00 AM), http:// 
blog.caranddriver.com/anthony-foxx-coolness-aside-self-driving-focus-should-be-
on-safety [https://perma.cc/5727-TXJ8]. 
 61. See SINGH, supra note 44, at 1.  
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knowledge that they develop. In contrast, the automated driving 
systems deployed by a particular developer will act less like 200 
million individual drivers and more like a single driver.62 Vehicle 
recalls today, which typically involve driving to a repair shop, 
generally achieve only a 75% completion rate.63 In contrast, many 
over-the-air software updates are likely to be fast and universal. 
Fourth, vehicles with automated driving systems are likely to 
be operated either in fleets or with the ongoing involvement of their 
developers.64 Consistently maintaining and regularly replacing these 
vehicles could improve the overall safety performance.65
Fifth, automated driving systems may be designed in ways that 
reduce the severity of crashes that nonetheless occur. Slower speeds 
mean less crash energy. In addition, at least two automated driving 
developers have suggested informally in conversations with me that 
their systems will operate only if every vehicle occupant is wearing a 
seatbelt. As the numbers above suggest, making seatbelt use a 
condition of operation could improve crash survival.66
Projections of these potential safety benefits are still 
preliminary.67 One analysis estimated that a combination of just 
 62. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS 2011 25-36 (2010), 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/onh2011.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9W4M-AZZM]. 
 63. New Survey Identifies Factors Influencing Recall Completion Rate,
ALLIANCE OF AUTO. MFRS. (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfm? 
objectid=FADB8130-6D32-11E5-997E000C296BA163 [https://perma.cc/JZQ5-8JRZ]. 
 64. See, e.g., Rob Matheson, Startup Bringing Driverless Taxi Service to 
Singapore, MIT NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016), https://news.mit.edu/2016/startup-nutonomy-
driverless-taxi-service-singapore-0324 [https://perma.cc/U4A9-2BEY]; see also infra
discussion at notes 280-90 (discussing service models). 
 65. NHTSA, DOT HS 811 825, HOW VEHICLE AGE AND MODEL YEAR
RELATE TO DRIVER INJURY SEVERITY IN FATAL CRASHES 2 (2013), https://crashstats. 
nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811825 [https://perma.cc/UP6H-U2AL]. 
 66. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 67. Cf., e.g., MYRA BLANCO ET AL., VA. TECH TRANSP. INST., AUTOMATED 
VEHICLE CRASH RATE COMPARISON USING NATURALISTIC DATA 1, 72 (2016), http:// 
www.vtti.vt.edu/PDFs/Automated%20Vehicle%20Crash%20Rate%20Comparison%20
Using%20Naturalistic%20Data_Final%20Report_20160107.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JGE-
2WNV] (“The currently low amount of miles driven from [Google’s] Self-Driving 
Car project makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the potential safety impact 
of self-driving cars.”); SCOTT SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BENEFITS 
ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLE OPERATIONS 53 (2015), 
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/55000/55400/55443/AVBenefitFrameworkFinalReport082615_
Cover1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EQG-RWBT] (describing the safety impact 
methodology framework to be applied to automated driving safety estimates); 
Memorandum from Nathaniel Beuse, Assoc. Adm’r for Vehicle Safety Research, to 
 Automated Driving & Product Liability 17 
blind-spot monitoring, lane departure warning, and forward collision 
warning could, with total adoption and effectiveness, “prevent or 
reduce the severity of as many as 1.3 million [U.S.] crashes annually, 
including 133,000 injury crashes and 10,100 fatal crashes.”68
NHTSA estimated that a “fully mature” vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communications system “could potentially address” about 80% of 
crashes today.69 Although V2V communications are distinct from 
automated driving,70 many of the crash types that NHTSA examined 
involved perception failures that automated systems may also be able 
to address. 
The common suggestion that “driverless cars” are “already 
safer” than conventional vehicles remains premature. With the 
exception of low-speed applications in limited environments,71 truly 
driverless motor vehicles do not yet exist in a commercial sense. 
Advanced driver assistance systems like Tesla’s Autopilot72 are at 
most “partial automation” that operate with the expectation that 
human drivers will actively monitor the roadway and intervene as 
Docket Number NHTSA 2014-0070 (June 2, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/ 
document?D=NHTSA-2014-0070-0002 [https://perma.cc/2H3G-HEWX] (noting 
NHTSA’s current work on “the potential incremental safety benefits for automated 
vehicle functions/concepts”). For a thorough assessment of potential safety benefits 
in the distinct but nonetheless relevant context of vehicle-to-vehicle 
communications, see HARDING ET AL., supra note 17, at xiv. 
 68. Corey D. Harper, Chris T. Hendrickson & Constantine Samaras, Cost 
and Benefit Estimates of Partially-Automated Vehicle Collision Avoidance 
Technologies, 95 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 104, 108 (2016). 
 69. HARDING ET AL., supra note 17, at 18. 
 70. See Bryant Walker Smith, A Legal Perspective on Three 
Misconceptions in Vehicle Automation, in LECTURE NOTES IN MOBILITY: ROAD 
VEHICLE AUTOMATION 85, 89 (Gereon Meyer & Sven Beiker eds., 2014). 
 71. E.g., CITYMOBIL2, http://www.citymobil2.eu/en/ [https://perma.cc/37U8-
PFFU] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016); Heathrow Pod: Self Guided Tour Instructions,
ULTRA GLOBAL PRT, http://www.ultraglobalprt.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Ultra_ 
SelfTour2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DUW-3J5S] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016); Mine of the 
Future, RIO TINTO, http://www.riotinto.com/australia/pilbara/mine-of-the-future-9603. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/NQC3-R7B7] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 72. Model S Software Version 7.0, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/presskit/ 
autopilot [https://perma.cc/7CQA-N45K] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
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needed.73 Even Google’s research vehicles are closely supervised by 
professional safety drivers when on public roads.74
Moreover, just because an automated system should be safer 
than humans does not necessarily mean that it will be safer; surprises 
abound on roads as well as in software. No company has logged the 
hundreds of millions of miles that might provide a statistical 
comparison of actual crash and injury rates,75 and early empirical 
claims are necessarily limited. A study commissioned by Google 
compared conventional driving to supervised automated driving.76
Tesla’s statements about the relative performance of its Autopilot are 
lacking.77
Even the prediction that automated driving will be safer than 
conventional driving requires some important caveats. First, this 
superior safety will be broadly statistical; given everything that 
happens in the three trillion vehicle miles traveled annually in the 
United States,78 there will be individual incidents of diminished 
safety.79 Second, early automated driving systems may have limited 
 73. SAE INT’L, J3106, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED 
TO ON-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLE AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS (2014) [hereinafter 
SAE J3016] (defining six levels of driving automation). 
 74. On The Road, GOOGLE SELF-DRIVING CAR PROJECT, https:/ 
/www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/where/ [https://perma.cc/8DF4-9F57] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2016) (“There are test drivers aboard all vehicles for now.”). 
 75. Bryant Walker Smith, Driving at Perfection, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y
(Mar. 11, 2012, 3:20 PM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/03/driving-
perfection [https://perma.cc/CV7X-AKQX]; NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK,
RAND CORP., DRIVING TO SAFETY: HOW MANY MILES OF DRIVING WOULD IT TAKE 
TO DEMONSTRATE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE RELIABILITY? (2016), https://www.rand. 
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1478/RAND_RR1478.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SUG5-PRQ4]. Other approaches to the question of demonstrating 
safety are also possible. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.  
 76. See BLANCO ET AL., supra note 67. 
 77. See Nick Lum & Edward Niedermeyer, How Tesla and Elon Musk 
Exaggerated Safety Claims About Autopilot and Cars, THE DAILY BEAST (July 14, 
2016, 1:00 AM.), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/07/14/why-tesla-s-cars-
and-autopilot-aren-t-as-safe-as-elon-musk-claims.html [https://perma.cc/D5F7-GLLD]; 
Tom Simonite, Tesla’s Dubious Claims About Autopilot’s Safety Record, MIT TECH.
REV. (July 6, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601849/teslas-dubious-
claims-about-autopilots-safety-record/ [https://perma.cc/4BPL-TMPF]. 
 78. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE HIGHWAY POL’Y INFO., TRAFFIC 
VOLUME TRENDS: DECEMBER 2015 (2016), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
policyinformation/travel_monitoring/15dectvt/15dectvt.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4RZ-
Z93L] [hereinafter 2015 TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS]. 
 79. Cf., e.g., Preliminary Report, Highway HWY16FH018, NAT’L TRANSP.
SAFETY BD., (July 26, 2016), http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/
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operational design domains; for example, they may not initially 
operate in snow or other challenging environments. Third, unlikely 
systemic risks—of which cyberattacks are the most prominent—
could affect this overall safety performance if they are realized on a 
massive scale. Fourth, automated driving could conceivably increase 
the rate of minor crashes even while decreasing the rate of more 
serious crashes.80
A comparison between automated driving and conventional 
driving also misses the potential contribution of active safety systems 
intended to assist rather than replace a human driver.81 In terms of 
safety performance, an automated driving system could be compared 
not only to a human driver but also to that driver as assisted by lane 
departure warnings, automatic braking, and even more advanced 
forms of automated emergency intervention. This is discussed more 
below.
Finally, a substantial increase in vehicle miles traveled could 
negate some of these potential safety gains. Automation could 
conceivably induce additional travel by making that travel less 
stressful, less expensive, or more productive.82 Some vehicles may 
even deliver goods, circulate while waiting for passengers, return 
home or seek parking after completing a drop off, collect 
neighborhood data, or display advertising—all without any human 
on board.83 Consider a hypothetical illustration: If automated driving 
halves the crash rate while doubling the number of vehicle miles 
traveled, the total number of crashes would stay the same.  
For the reasons discussed above, automating every motor 
vehicle trip could reduce total crash magnitude. In short: Automated 
driving systems may crash less frequently and less severely, and 
Pages/HWY16FH018-preliminary.aspx [https://perma.cc/NL6T-S4PZ] [hereinafter 
HWY16FH018]. 
 80. Cf. BLANCO ET AL., supra note 67; Signalized Intersections: An 
Informational Guide, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
intersection/conventional/signalized/fhwasa13027/ch1.cfm [https://perma.cc/QD4Q-
362T] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (describing how traffic signals can increase the 
frequency but reduce the severity of crashes). 
 81. See Bryant Walker Smith, Presentation at the 2012 Road Vehicle 
Automation Workshop: Autolaw 3.0 (July 24-26, 2012), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/ 
onlinepubs/conferences/2012/Automation/presentations/WalkerSmith.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/QF43-VZBQ]; see also Walker Smith, supra note 16. 
 82. See Bryant Walker Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation 
Demand, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1401, 1401-02 (2012). 
 83. A crash involving a vehicle making zero-occupancy trips might still 
injure (only) those outside that vehicle. 
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those who are involved in these crashes may be better protected. 
Figure 4 illustrates this broad prediction: The pie on the left 
(representing crash magnitude today) is larger than the pie on the 
right (representing crash magnitude if every motor vehicle trip were 
automated).
Figure 4
Crash magnitude here means the total number of crashes 
weighted by their severity.84 As a practical matter, such weighting is 
difficult: How many severe injuries, for example, is equivalent to a 
fatality? Although valuation matters for the subsequent liability 
analysis, this initial comparison of crash magnitude requires no 
further granularity or equivalence. 
The dotted circle around the right pie illustrates how an 
increase in vehicle miles traveled could complicate this comparison. 
However, this potential complication is less relevant to this Article’s 
focus on managing product liability. There is some relationship 
between vehicle miles traveled and automaker revenue (as more 
miles traveled may lead to more frequent vehicle turnover) and an 
even stronger relationship between vehicle miles traveled and 
operator revenue (as ride services often charge at least in part by 
distance traveled). This means that more miles traveled could mean 
both more crashes and more revenue to offset that potential liability.  
 84. A thousand injury-free crashes may be preferable to a single fatal crash. 
At the same time, the costs associated with a severe injury (such as lifetime medical 
care) may be more recoverable than those associated with a fatality. See infra
discussion at notes 87-100. 
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CRASH COST
In 2010, motor vehicle crashes in the United States imposed 
societal costs of some $836 billion.85 This figure—
$836,000,000,000—is the most recent to come from NHTSA’s 
multi-decade effort to understand the costs of driving.86 That 
complex undertaking is the focus of this section. 
About one-third of the $836 billion accounts for “the value of 
resources that are used or that would be required to restore crash 
victims, to the extent possible, to their pre-crash physical and 
financial status.”87 These economic costs include $23 billion in 
medical expenses, $76 billion in property damage, $77 billion in lost 
productivity, $28 billion in congestion impacts, and $37 billion in 
additional economic costs.88 They can be “estimated in a fairly direct 
manner through empirical measurements.”89
The remaining two-thirds represents both loss of life and 
diminished quality of life. “In the case of death, victims are deprived 
of their entire remaining lifespan. In the case of serious injury, the 
impact on the lives of crash victims can involve extended or even 
lifelong impairment or physical pain, which can interfere with or 
prevent even the most basic living functions.”90 The value of a 
statistical life (VSL) can be used to represent the cost of a fatality 
and scaled for a nonfatal injures.91 VSL is inferred from how much 
consumers will either pay to avoid a risk of death or demand to 
accept a risk of death.92 The $836 billion is based on a VSL of just 
under $9 million;93 using other established values produces total 
costs ranging from about $500 billion to over $1 trillion.94
 85. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 5 (in 2010 dollars). In 2010, there 
were “32,999 fatalities, 3.9 million non-fatal injuries, and 24 million damages 
vehicles.” Id. at 1. 
 86. Id.
 87. Id. at 113. 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. at 113. 
 90. Id.
 91. Id. at 116. Because some costs that are explicit in the economic 
calculations are implicit in the VSL measure, “combining measures of economic 
costs and lost quality-of-life requires an adjustment to avoid double counting these 
components.” Id. at 117. 
 92. Id. at 113-14. For example, “‘willingness to pay’ studies (WTP) are most 
frequently based on wage rate differentials for risky jobs, or on studies of the prices 
consumers pay for products that reduce their risk of being fatally injured.” Id. at 113. 
 93. Id. at 114 (2010 dollars based on 2012 dollars). 
 94. Id. at 10. 
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As Figures 5, 6, and 7 illustrate,95 crash injuries vary widely in 
severity and hence in cost. Crashes involving property damage only 
(PDO) account for a vast majority of total crashes but less than 10% 
of total crash costs.96 In contrast, fatal crashes account for less than 
half of 1% of all crashes but over a third of total crash costs.97 This is 
because of the high costs of each fatality.98 Depending on the 
severity, injuries can also cost millions of dollars.99 These costs are 
only averages, and “in individual cases they can be exceeded by a 
factor of three or more.”100
Figure 5 
 95. See id. at 13, 16, 17 (2010 numbers). For simplicity, the paragraph 
above references crashes. In contrast, the figures reference crash victims and, in the 
case of property-damage only (PDO) crashes, crash vehicles. A single crash can 
involve multiple victims with different levels of severity. The “no injury” category 
on the figures (and in the NHTSA report on which they are based) refers to 
uninjured participants of crashes in which others were injured. Id.
 96. Id.
 97. NHTSA, DOT HS 811 552, 2010 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW
(2012), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811552 [https:// 
perma.cc/T4PK-NVTU]; NHTSA, DOT HS 811 659, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2010 
(2011), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811659 [https:// 
perma.cc/87L4-K2R6]. 
 98. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 4. 
 99. See id. at 26. 
 100. Id. at 8. 
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Figure 6 
Figure 7
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Who actually pays these costs? 
Most of the total burden falls on the direct and indirect victims 
of tragic crashes. The child who never reaches adulthood loses 
something of intrinsic value even though that something cannot be 
transacted. So do her parents and siblings. The same is true for the 
adult who never reaches old age—as well as for her family, friends, 
colleagues, and larger community. The marathon runner whose leg is 
amputated also loses something, even if she ultimately competes in 
different ways or discovers new perspectives and abilities as a result 
of that loss.101 These costs are real even if they are not transactional, 
and failing to reimburse them does not make them disappear. 
Individual crash victims also bear roughly one-quarter of the 
explicitly economic costs of their crashes.102 These victims “pay a 
modest portion of medical care, and absorb significant portions of 
both market and household productivity losses, as well as property 
damage.”103 The unreimbursed costs can be substantial. “Depending 
on the financial ability and insurance coverage of the individual 
crash victims,” these costs “can be catastrophic to the victim’s 
economic wellbeing in addition to their physical and emotional 
condition.”104 In a 1999 study of bankruptcy petitioners, one out of 
four respondents cited illness or injury as a reason for their 
bankruptcy filing.105
 101. This is fraught. See, e.g., Trude Arnesen & Erik Nord, The Value of 
DALY Life: Problems with Ethics and Validity of Disability Adjusted Life Years, 319 
BMJ 1423 (1999), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1117148/ [https://
perma.cc/a3M7T-3PM6]; Tom Shakespeare & Bryan Vernon, Disability Rights and 
Resuscitation: Do Not Attempt Reconciliation?, in DISABLED PEOPLE AND THE RIGHT
TO LIFE: THE PROTECTION AND VIOLATION OF DISABLED PEOPLE’S MOST BASIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS 99-101 (Luke Clements & Janet Read eds., 2008). 
 102. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 238-40. 
 103. Id. at 238. For more background on these cost estimates, see id. at 38-
48.
 104. Id. at 8. 
 105. Elizabeth Warren, Teresa Sullivan & Melissa Jacoby, Medical 
Problems and Bankruptcy Filings 4 (Harvard Law Sch. Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 009, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=224581 [https://perma.cc/H5UR-QJX2]. But see
Edward R. Morrison et al., Health and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Car 
Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy 24 (U of Chi. Law Sch. Coase-Sandor Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 655, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353328 [https://perma.cc/569K-3MTC] (finding no causal 
connection between vehicle crashes and bankruptcy filings). Bankruptcy transfers 
some costs from an individual to society. 
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Society at large bears the remaining three-quarters of the 
economic cost.106 Private insurers cover 54% largely by charging 
policyholders.107 People who travel, shop, and breathe pay for 12% in 
the form of longer travel times, additional fuel purchases, higher 
shipping prices, and impacts associated with increased pollution.108
Governments at all levels cover 8% by taxing current and future 
taxpayers.109 In 2010, these economic costs alone came to $784 
annually for every person in the United States.110
Nearly every state requires motorists to carry third-party 
liability insurance (or to otherwise demonstrate financial 
responsibility),111 and many states further require motorists to 
purchase insurance for injuries caused by uninsured or underinsured 
motorists.112 (In 2012, 12.6% of motorists were uninsured.)113 These 
required minimums, however, are manifestly inadequate for any 
serious injury. Most states require coverage of only $25,000 per 
fatality.114 To protect their assets, many drivers carry liability 
insurance above the legal minimum—but median household net 
 106. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 240. 
 107. Id.
 108. Id. at 2, 50, 239. $28,027,000,000 / $241,988,000,000 = 11.6%. Id. at 
11.
 109. Id. at 6. 
 110. Id. at 5. 
 111. Compulsory Auto/Uninsured Motorists, INS. INFO. INST. (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.iii.org/issue-update/compulsory-auto-uninsured-motorists [https://perma.cc/ 
AT9F-TB36]. New Hampshire is the exception. Id.
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.
 114. Id. In contrast, German law requires at least €1 million in third-party 
liability coverage for personal injury. BEWACHUNGSVERORDNUNG [BEWACHV]
[Regulation on the Security Industry] Haftpflichtversicherung [liability insurance], 
Oct. 7, 2013, BGBL. I at 1378, § 6 (Ger.); see also GESETZ ÜBER DIE 
PFLICHTVERSICHERUNG FÜR KRAFTFAHRZEUGHALTER [PflVG] [Law on Compulsory 
Insurance of Vehicle Owners], Aug. 31, 2015, BGBL. I at 1474, § 4 (Ger.); Walker 
Smith, supra note 16, at 35-36 (advocating a substantial increase in the amount of 
third-party liability insurance required). 
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worth was only $69,000 in 2011.115 The average societal cost of a 
fatality is more than 100 times these numbers.116
If automated driving reduces the magnitude of crashes, then it 
should also reduce the societal costs of crashes. A 15% across-the-
board decline in crashes, for example, would reduce annual crash 
costs by some $125 billion.117 Replacing 10,000 fatal injuries with 
10,000 minor injuries would reduce costs by some $90 billion.118
Even replacing those fatalities with 100,000 minor injuries would 
still save some $86 billion.119
Once again, there are numerous caveats. Some costly elements 
of the crash infrastructure, such as trauma centers, may need to exist 
regardless of how much crashes decline. Because organ donations 
often come from motor vehicle crash victims, fewer fatal crashes 
could mean fewer organs donated to others in need.120 Vehicles with 
automated driving systems may be more expensive to repair than 
conventional vehicles, which could raise the average cost of even 
minor crashes.121 If automated driving increases the number of these 
minor crashes, the aggregate economic effect could be large. And 
automated driving could conceivably increase total vehicle miles 
traveled, which could countervail improvements in per-mile safety.122
Generally, however, most of these issues probably fall into the 
category of “good problems to have.” Serious motor vehicle crashes 
dramatically upend lives—often young lives123—in ways that cannot 
 115. Marina Vornovitsky, Alfred Gottschalck & Adam Smith, Distribution 
of Household Wealth in the U.S.: 2000 to 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), 
https://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth%20distribution%202000%20to
%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TUR-X6KX]. Moreover, much of this wealth may 
be sheltered by law from tort liability. Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof 
Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 623 (2006); See Bert I. Huang, Surprisingly 
Punitive Damages, 100 VA. L. REV. 1027, 1034–35 (2014). 
 116. See also Walker Smith, supra note 16, at 35. 
 117. See id. at 30-32. 
 118. $90 billion í $400 million = $90 billion (calculated to one significant 
figure).
 119. $90 billion í $4 billion = $86 billion.
 120. See Justine Hofherr, What Do Driverless Cars Have to Do With Organ 
Donors?, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 23, 2015), https://www.boston.com/cars/news-and-
reviews/2015/01/23/what-driverless-cars-have-with-organ-donors/nhSxw0YRrC0X 
iNUjUuXwNP/story.html [https://perma.cc/DC6J-R2KQ]; see also Stacy Dickert-
Conlin, Todd Elder & Brian Moore, Donorcycles: Motorcycle Helmet Laws and the 
Supply of Organ Donors, 54 J. L. & ECON. 907, 908 (2011). 
 121. Self-Driving Cars and Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (July 2016), http:// 
www.iii.org/issue-update/self-driving-cars-and-insurance [https://perma.cc/58L8-9JQD].  
 122. See supra discussion at notes 78-80. 
 123. See supra discussion at notes 45-58. 
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be fully expressed in financial terms, even though these are the terms 
on which this Article is based. 
Figure 8 illustrates the potential change in societal crash costs 
if automated driving substantially increases motor vehicle safety: 
The pie on the left (representing total crash costs today) is larger than 
the pie on the right (representing total crash costs if every motor 
vehicle trip were automated). 
Figure 8 
PRODUCT FAILURE
This section considers those crashes to which the failure of a 
vehicle or a component thereof contributes. Narrowly construed, this 
category might include only those crashes in which a vehicle 
component breaks or malfunctions. More broadly construed, 
however, this category could include a wide range of suboptimal 
interactions between a vehicle and the humans who operate, use, or 
otherwise interact with it. 
Although vehicle condition in the narrow sense contributes to 
crashes, the contribution is far less than that of human error.124 A 
1985 study estimated that vehicle issues are the sole cause of 2% of 
 124. For a discussion of human error, see supra note 46 and accompanying 
text. 
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crashes and a partial cause of another 10% of crashes.125 A NHTSA 
analysis of the single “last event in the crash causal chain” identified 
“a vehicle component’s failure or degradation” in 2% of crashes.126
This number, however, may not fully account for “internal vehicle 
related problems that might have led to the crash,” but were not 
readily apparent to crash investigators.127
The incredible sophistication of modern motor vehicles means 
that concerns about automotive electronics are not limited to 
automated driving.128 “Electronic systems have become critical to the 
functioning of the modern automobile.”129 These “increasingly 
interconnected . . . systems are creating opportunities to improve 
vehicle safety and reliability as well as demands for addressing new 
system safety and cybersecurity risks.”130 In the early 2000s, highly 
publicized incidents of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles 
prompted widespread speculation about the electronic throttles in 
these vehicles.131 While both NHTSA and NASA ultimately found no 
evidence of an electronic cause of unintended acceleration in real-
world use,132 at least one jury may have believed otherwise.133
 125. Harry Lum & Jerry A. Reagan, Interactive Highway Safety Design 
Model: Accident Predictive Module, 59 PUB. ROADS (1995), http://www.fhwa.dot. 
gov/publications/publicroads/95winter/p95wi14.cfm [https://perma.cc/JZ92-CJN2]. 
The roadway was the sole cause of 3% of crashes and a partial cause of 31% of 
crashes. Id.
 126. SINGH, supra note 44, at 1. The driving environment was the critical 
reason in 2% of crashes. Id.
 127. Id. at 2. 
 128. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., SPECIAL REPORT 308:
THE SAFETY PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS: INSIGHTS
FROM UNINTENDED ACCELERATION (2012), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/13342/trb-
special-report-308-the-safety-challenge-and-promise-of-automotive-electronics [https:// 
perma.cc/JYN2-CV8U]; NHTSA, REPORT TO CONGRESS: “ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 
PERFORMANCE IN PASSENGER MOTOR VEHICLES” (2015); VAN EIKEMA HOMMES,
NHTSA, DOT HS 812 285, ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY STANDARDS FOR AUTOMOTIVE 
ELECTRONIC CONTROL SYSTEMS (2016). 
 129. SPECIAL REPORT 308, supra note 128 at 2. 
 130. Id. at 68.  
 131. See Jaclyn Trop, Toyota Seeks a Settlement for Sudden Acceleration 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/business/ 
toyota-seeks-settlement-for-lawsuits.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z8PZ-QS9E]. 
 132. NHTSA, TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF TOYOTA ELECTRONIC THROTTLE 
CONTROL (ETC) SYSTEMS 62 (2011), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/ 
NHTSA-UA_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT86-ZWHW] [hereinafter TOYOTA
ASSESSMENT]; NASA ENGINEERING & SAFETY CTR., NHTSA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
TO THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (NHTSA) ON THE 
REPORTED TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION (TMC) UNINTENDED ACCELERATION (UA)
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Even when every component performs as intended, design 
issues may still contribute to crashes. In these situations, the line 
between design failure and driver failure is often blurry. For 
example, NHTSA attributed many instances of unintended 
acceleration to pedal misapplication by the driver.134 But even in 
these cases, a design decision—whether the close placement of the 
brake and accelerator pedals or merely the traditional placement of 
these two input devices in a position that is out of sight and operable 
only by foot—may have contributed to that misapplication.135 Other 
design decisions, including the operation of the emergency off 
switch, may have exacerbated some occurrences of unintended 
acceleration.136
More broadly, design issues related to “human factors” or 
“human-machine interaction” reflect the fact that humans drive 
motor vehicles.137 When a vehicle crashes at 120 miles per hour, 
excessive speed is likely to be a contributing factor. In general, 
however, such a speed is reached only because a human decides to 
drive a vehicle that fast and the vehicle is actually capable of that 
speed. Similarly, drunk driving generally occurs only when a human 
decides to drive a vehicle while drunk and that vehicle has no 
alcohol ignition interlock that would preclude operation by an 
intoxicated driver. By no means are these examples intended to 
diminish the driver’s role. Rather, they merely show that many 
crashes are actually complex products of numerous design and 
driving decisions.138
Regardless, as discussed above, driver error is widely accepted 
as the key factor in the vast majority of today’s crashes. This is in 
part because human drivers continue to make almost all of the real-
time decisions necessary for driving, from the tactical (such as travel 
speed) to the operational (such as how to avoid a vehicle swerving 
into the travel lane).139 Electronic systems may inform those 
INVESTIGATION (2011), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NASA-UA_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7C5X-P7E4]. 
 133. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Toyota Settles Oklahoma Acceleration Case 
After Verdict, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2013, 12:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2013-10-25/toyota-settles-oklahoma-acceleration-case-after-jury-verdict 
[https://perma.cc/KBR3-WP8V]. 
 134. TOYOTA ASSESSMENT, supra note 132, at viii. 
 135. Id. at 52.  
 136. Id. at 51-52. 
 137. See id. at 30 n.58. 
 138. See id. at 66. 
 139. SAE J3016, supra note 73. 
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decisions (in the case of blind-spot warnings), implement those 
decisions (in the case of cruise control), or optimize those decisions 
(in the case of electronic stability control), but humans remain the 
drivers for all practical purposes. 
In many ways, automated driving systems will essentially drive 
tomorrow’s vehicles. NHTSA has even suggested as much in the 
context of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS).140
Because these systems will make many if not all of the real-time 
decisions necessary for driving, it is widely accepted that design 
issues will play a much greater role in automated driving crashes 
than in today’s conventional driving crashes.141
These systems will eliminate some forms of driver error while 
introducing new opportunities for other forms of error. These new 
errors may involve the physical failure of a relevant component, the 
provision or use of flawed data, a reliance on buggy code, the 
execution of an unreasonable driving decision, suboptimal 
interaction among system components, or inadequate communication 
with other road users, to name just a few. Designing an automated 
driving system that minimizes, manages, and mitigates these errors is 
an immense technical challenge. 
The complex world in which these systems will eventually 
operate poses further challenges. Drivers in the United States travel 
three trillion vehicle miles every year142 on some four million miles 
of road.143 These roads may have potholes, black ice, roadway debris, 
 140. Letter from NHTSA to Chris Urmson, Dir. of Google, Inc.’s Self-
Driving Car Project (Feb. 4, 2016), http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--% 
20compiled%20response%20to%2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--
%204%20Feb%2016%20final.htm [https://perma.cc/LU7R-QMAM] (“As a 
foundational starting point for the interpretations below, NHTSA will interpret 
‘driver’ in the context of Google’s described motor vehicle design as referring to 
[Google’s self-driving system (SDS)]. . . . In this instance, an item of motor vehicle 
equipment, the SDS, is actually driving the vehicle.”). NHTSA’s conclusion is 
limited to the FMVSS. “Driver” has a distinct and likely broader meaning in many 
state vehicle codes. See Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably 
Legal in the United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 433 (2014). Moreover, in 
contrast to the FMVSS, these codes generally treat a driver or operator as a legal 
person. Id. at 477. 
 141. See Walker Smith, supra note 140, at 419.  
 142. 2015 TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS, supra note 78. 
 143. BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TABLE 1-6:
ESTIMATED U.S. ROADWAY LANE-MILES BY FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM, http:// 
www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation
_statistics/html/table_01_06.html) [https://perma.cc/ZF82-DMUX] (last visited Nov. 
16, 2016). 
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crossing animals, falling animals, stalled vehicles, maintenance or 
construction crews, emergency responders, and wrong-way “ghost 
drivers,” if not actual ghosts.144 Publicly available videos from 
dashboard-mounted cameras illustrate the wide variety of unusual, 
dangerous, and tragic situations that human drivers today cause or 
confront.145 Anything that could conceivably happen on the road will 
eventually happen—as well as many things that cannot be conceived 
in advance. 
Even demonstrating the safety of automated driving may be 
daunting. The level of safety assurance demanded of aircraft systems 
would require at least a billion hours of testing.146 A statistical 
comparison between automated and conventional driving could 
require hundreds of millions of miles of representative driving—and 
probably much more.147 There are many views on, and little 
consensus about, demonstrating reasonable safety.148 I have argued 
that developers of automated driving systems should have the 
opportunity and even the obligation to make public safety cases that 
evidence a lifecycle approach to defining, measuring, monitoring, 
and ensuring reasonable safety.149
Figure 9 illustrates the increased contribution of product failure 
to motor vehicle crashes. This figure is based on the initial figure 
showing crash magnitude. As the pie on the left shows, vehicle 
failure, as generally conceived, contributes to only a small portion of 
today’s crashes. As the pie on the right shows, the shift in real-time 
decision-making from human driver to automated driving system 
 144. See Nick Kurczewski, Creepy, Cursed, and Curvy: New Jersey’s 
Clinton Road is the Most Frightening Road in America., N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 23, 
2014, 1:02 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/autos/creepy-cursed-curvy-new-jersey-
clinton-road-frightening-road-america-article-1.1803331 [https://perma.cc/6L6P-6SET]. 
 145. See, e.g., YOUTUBE.COM, https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query= 
dash+cam+compilation [https://perma.cc/L8CU-CLTP] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) 
(searching for “dash cam compilation”). 
 146. See Philip Koopman & Michael Wagner, Challenges in Autonomous 
Vehicle Testing and Validation, 4 SAE INT’L J. TRANSP. SAFETY 15, 15-16 (2016); 
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION [ISO], ISO 26262-1:2011, ROAD VEHICLES—
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY (2011), http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=43464
[https://perma.cc/DSP7-56BE]; INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N [IEC],
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY AND IEC 61508 (2016), http://www.iec.ch/functionalsafety/ 
[https://perma.cc/SN3L-5QQP]. 
 147. See Walker Smith, supra note 75; KALRA & PADDOCK, supra note 75, at 2. 
 148. See generally KALRA & PADDOCK, supra note 75. 
 149. Bryant Walker Smith, Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, in
AUTONOMES FAHREN 593, 597 (Markus Maurer et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter 
Regulation and the Risk of Inaction]. 
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means that vehicle failure is likely to explain a far greater proportion 
of the crashes that still occur. 
Figure 9 
INDUSTRY LIABILITY
The abstract question of “who is responsible in a crash” is as 
unhelpful as it is popular.150 At the outset, responsibility is not 
necessarily legal in nature; it can also be moral or technical. Even 
within the legal domain, responsibility as a concept can contemplate 
prospective obligations or authorities as well as retrospective 
liabilities.151 These retrospective liabilities can be criminal, 
administrative, or civil in nature. Asking who is civilly liable in the 
event of a crash is therefore more precise—but not necessarily any 
more helpful. 
Courts and legislatures have spent the last century developing, 
disrupting, and refining the rules of civil liability in the realms of 
tort, contract, insurance, property, and product liability law. An 
individual injured in a crash may sue multiple natural or legal 
persons152 and may ultimately recover from all, some, or none of 
 150. See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Big Question About Driverless Cars No One 
Seems Able to Answer, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/02/17/the-big-question-about-driverless-cars-no-one-
seems-to-have-an-answer-to/ [https://perma.cc/T6W6-MCFD]. 
 151. See Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, supra note 149, at 596. 
 152. A corporation is a legal person. 
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them. If a plaintiff successfully recovers damages from a defendant, 
that defendant may in turn be able to recover some or all of these 
damages from another natural or legal person. The outcome depends 
in part on how the specific laws of the particular jurisdiction align 
with the specific facts of the particular crash. 
Insurers play many roles in this process. A crash victim who 
has automotive, health, or life insurance might seek payment directly 
from the provider of that insurance. The victim may additionally or 
alternatively seek payment from an insurer that provides liability 
coverage to a would-be defendant. In the event of litigation, that 
insurer may defend its insured and ultimately pay some or all of the 
costs incurred in that litigation. Any of these insurers may seek to 
collect some of its costs from another liable party through 
subrogation of its insured’s claim. Finally, these insurers may 
themselves rely on a variety of risk-spreading mechanisms, including 
reinsurance, to which they may turn for recovery. These functions 
are similar even in states with limited no-fault automotive insurance 
regimes.153
Largely because of automotive insurance, the vast majority of 
crashes are handled without any litigation.154 Accordingly, legal costs 
represent only 1.3% of total societal crash costs.155 Even when a 
lawsuit is filed, it is highly unlikely to proceed all the way to a 
verdict by a judge or jury. Of the roughly 4,000 motor vehicle 
personal injury cases that terminated in U.S. district courts in 2015, 
only 3% actually reached trial.156
Westlaw’s Case Evaluator, which aggregates verdicts from 
multiple jurisdictions, also points to an absolute decline in the 
 153. Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/auto-
insurance [https://perma.cc/D677-ME4L] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter 
Auto Insurance].
 154. Cf. id. (showing a claim frequency for collision coverage of 5.95 claims 
per 100 car years). 
 155. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 16. 
 156. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS–CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT,
AND ACTION TAKEN, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2015
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/ 
2015/12/31 [https://perma.cc/FL5S-JG7M]. This figure includes both cases in which 
the United States was a defendant and private cases in which there was diversity of 
citizenship among the parties. Id. Three percent is actually higher than many other 
kinds of claims. See, e.g., id.; Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination 
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 459 (2004); Xavier Rodriguez, The Decline of Civil Jury Trials: A Positive 
Development, Myth, or the End of Justice as We Now Know It?, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J.
333 (2014). 
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number of verdicts.157 Figure 10 shows how the number of recorded 
verdicts in motor vehicle-related negligence claims has fallen since 
the mid-2000s. Similarly, Figure 11 shows how the number of 
recorded verdicts in motor vehicle-related product liability claims 
has declined even more dramatically.158 Public settlements, which are 
also shown on the figures, represent only a small portion of all 
settlements. 
Figure 10
 157. See infra Figure 10.  
 158. See infra Figure 11. 
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Figure 11
Even settlements and other case dispositions, however, occur 
against the backdrop of those relatively few cases that do reach a 
verdict. Those verdicts provide external benchmarks for the standard 
of reasonable care to which a defendant may be held and the amount 
of compensation, if any, to which a plaintiff may be entitled. These 
verdicts also clarify the relevant legal rules, particularly when a 
losing party appeals to a higher court. 
Most personal injury cases involve claims of negligence. This 
includes 99% of the 80,000 relevant verdicts in Westlaw’s Case 
Evaluator from 2006 through 2015.159 The plaintiff asserting a 
negligence claim must show that the defendant breached a legal duty 
by acting unreasonably in a way that proximately caused legally 
recognized harm to the plaintiff.160 Defendants are frequently 
individual motorists, and this Article uses the term vehicular 
negligence to refer to negligence claims against these individuals or 
 159. See supra Figure 10. 
 160. Or, more specifically, that the defendant breached a legal duty by acting 
unreasonably in a way that proximately caused legally recognized harm to the 
plaintiff. 
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their principals.161 However, defendants may also include 
manufacturers, sellers, and other companies.162
In contrast, defendants in a product liability case are generally 
the entities that make, distribute, or sell the product or product 
component that allegedly harmed the plaintiff.163 In its broad sense 
(and as used in this Article), product liability law encompasses a 
variety of claims, including negligence. This area of the law varies 
tremendously in both time and space: It has evolved dramatically 
over the last 100 years, and this evolution has produced strikingly 
different rules in different states.164 About 6% of the relevant verdicts 
in Westlaw’s Case Evaluator involve a product liability claim,165
which is comparable to estimates of the percent of crashes that are 
caused at least in part by a vehicle failure.166
Defect in a legal sense, however, is not necessarily coterminous 
with failure in a technical sense.167 The failure or degradation of a 
vehicle component does not necessarily mean that the component 
was defective. Vehicles that are reasonably safe when sold may be—
and in fact often are168—poorly maintained, and they may otherwise 
reach the end of their functional life. Tire condition, for example, is a 
particularly obvious factor in some crashes,169 but a tire is not 
necessarily defective merely because it explodes. Conversely, a 
design may be defective even if a component does not physically fail 
 161. Under some circumstances, employers and vehicle owners that were not 
themselves negligent can nonetheless be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of 
their employees and permissive drivers.  
 162. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury 
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 19 (1996). 
 163. See id.
 164. See generally Richard C. Henke, Comparative Fault in Products 
Liability: Comparing California and New Jersey, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 301 
(2002); David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG.
955 (2007). 
 165. Many of these cases also include negligence claims. 
 166. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra PRODUCT FAILURE (previous Part) (discussing product failure 
in this technical sense). 
 168. See NHTSA, DOT HS 809 316, TIRE PRESSURE SPECIAL STUDY:
INTERVIEW DATA (2001), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/809316.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5ZNF-FJHM]. 
 169. See SINGH, supra note 44, at 2 (“Of the small percentage (2%) of the 
crashes in which the critical reason was assigned to the vehicle, [a] tire problem 
accounted for about 35 percent (±11.4%) of the crashes.”). 
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or degrade. For example, a plaintiff may allege that she was not 
adequately instructed on the proper use of a product.170
Crashworthiness claims—also known as enhanced injury or 
second collision claims171—are an especially important example. 
Because “[c]ollisions with or without fault of the user are clearly 
foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable,” that 
manufacturer has “a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its 
vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury 
in the event of a collision.”172 These claims can involve, for example, 
the absence of a particular safety device,173 a fuel tank fire,174 or a 
second collision between the plaintiff’s body and some part of the 
vehicle.175 Although numbers are not readily available, the attention 
paid to these claims by practicing attorneys,176 high courts,177
scholars,178 and at least one legislature179 suggests they are a 
significant part of contemporary automotive product liability. 
More broadly, the plaintiff in a product liability case must 
typically demonstrate that she was harmed by a product defect—that 
is, a dangerous characteristic of a product. If this defect is the result 
of an imperfect production process, then the plaintiff may be able to 
recover from the manufacturer even if the production process was 
 170. See William A. Weiler, Punitive Damages—Strict Products Liability—
Erie Doctrine, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 365, 382 (1987) (citing Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 
A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971)). 
 171. See Michael Hoenig, Resolution of “Crashworthiness” Design Claims,
55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 633 (1981). 
 172. Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 173. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 
(2011); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 174. See, e.g., Linert v. Foutz, 20 N.E.3d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 175. See, e.g., Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d 682, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2014) (“validat[ing] ‘roof crush’ as the cause of head and neck injuries sustained by 
belted occupants in rollover motor vehicle accidents”).  
 176. See, e.g., Crashworthiness Lawsuit, AM. INJURY ATTORNEY GRP.,
https://attorneygroup.com/lawsuits/products-liability/crashworthiness-lawsuit/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HT2V-7R22] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 177. See, e.g., Williamson, 562 U.S. 323; Geier, 529 U.S. 861; D’Amario v. 
Ford Motor Co., 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT.
§ 768.81. 
 178. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, The Tort-Proof Plaintiff: The Drunk in the 
Automobile, Crashworthiness Claims, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 707 (2009). 
 179. See, e.g., Fla. S.B. 142, 1st Sess. (Fla. 2011); see also, Larry M. Roth, 
Florida’s Motor Vehicle Crashworthiness Enhanced Injury Doctrine: “Wanted 
Dead Or . . .”, 18 BARRY L. REV. 389 (2013). 
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reasonable.180 However, if this defect is an aspect of the product’s 
design, then the plaintiff generally must show that the design itself 
was unreasonable, often by reference to a reasonable alternative 
design.181 Similarly, if the defect consists of incorrect or incomplete 
instructions for or warnings about the product, then the plaintiff must 
show that the information actually provided was unreasonable.182
Proving both that a product was defective and that this defect 
caused the plaintiff’s injuries can be difficult and expensive, 
particularly when expert witnesses are required. (Defending such a 
claim can also be expensive.) These costs can deter injured 
individuals from pursuing, attorneys from accepting, and parties 
from fully pursuing claims that are complicated, uncertain, or 
comparatively low in damages.183 The combination of litigation 
expenses and the contingent fee system also means that even 
successful plaintiffs will only see a portion of the actual settlement or 
award.184
Because they are public, jury awards can provide some insight 
into how injuries are valued. However, because of post-judgment 
appeals and settlements, these initial amounts do not necessarily 
reflect what the plaintiffs are ultimately awarded.185
Westlaw’s Case Evaluator provides rough data on awards by 
claim and injury type. The table below shows data for vehicular 
negligence and product liability cases involving death, paraplegia, 
and quadriplegia; significant case variations reduce the utility of 
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1998). 
 181. Id. at § 2(b). 
 182. Id. at § 2(c). 
 183. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as 
Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997). 
 184. See, e.g., Derek H. Swanson & Lin Wei, United States Automotive 
Products Liability Law: A Corporate Approach to Preventive Management, Risk 
Reduction, and Case Coordination for Chinese Automakers, MCGUIRE WOODS 1, 16 
(2009), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/us-automotive-
products-liability.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWA2-B375].  
 185. A 1989 GAO report found that, for the cases examined, 
Appeals and posttrial settlement negotiations resulted in final payments 
different from the initial verdicts in 30 percent of all cases, and reduced 
total award amounts by 43 percent. Reductions occurred in 50 percent of 
the cases won by plaintiffs and in 71 percent of the cases with awards of 
$1 million or more.  
U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., GAO-89-99, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE 
RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES 3-4 (1989), http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/148313.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S937-DMNG]. 
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aggregate data on less severe injuries. For each, it indicates the 
percent of cases in which the verdict favored the defendant, the 
median award for cases in which the verdict favored the plaintiff, 
and the median settlement amount in cases in which that amount was 
publicly disclosed. These awards are generally rounded to one 
significant figure, because any more specificity would merely mock 
precision.186
Figure 12












Death - MV 
Negligence 2670 38% $400,000 $2,000,000 
Death - MV Prod 
Liability 230 64% $700,000 $5,000,000 
Death - All Prod 
Liability 738 48% $400,000 $5,000,000 
Paraplegia - MV 
Negligence 123 30% $6,000,000 $9,000,000 
Paraplegia - All 
Prod Liability 63 72% $2,000,000 $10,000,000 
Quadriplegia - MV 
Negligence 102 26% $3,000,000 $15,000,000 
Quadriplegia - All 
Prod Liability 91 51% $3,000,000 $14,000,000 
All injuries - MV 
Negligence 81842 35% $50,000 $30,000 
All injuries - MV 
Prod Liability 4706 53% $400,000 $2,000,000 
All injuries - All 
Prod Liability 1013 59% $400,000 $3,000,000 
Recall that each fatality costs society about $9 million and each 
critical injury costs society about $6 million.187 (Paraplegia and 
quadriplegia are particularly critical injuries.) The median public 
settlements for fatal injuries are an order of magnitude lower than 
these estimates. The median awards for plaintiff verdicts, while more 
 186. These numbers are drawn from a decade of verdicts from a variety of 
jurisdictions involving a variety of disparate facts. The dataset almost certainly 
includes some miscoded or otherwise inappropriate cases. To provide a meaningful 
number of cases, the product liability data used in this Article sometimes relate to all 
product types rather than to motor vehicles only. 
 187. See BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 4.  
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comparable, are not necessarily final. Moreover, these medians 
exclude all the cases in which the verdict favors the defendant. 
Whereas most vehicular negligence verdicts in the dataset favor 
plaintiffs, most product liability verdicts favor defendants. That 
means that the median award across all product liability claims is 
actually $0.188
There are additional differences between the vehicular 
negligence and product liability awards in the dataset. For those 
motor vehicle-related injury cases that do result in a verdict for the 
plaintiff, the median product liability award is many times higher 
than the median vehicular negligence award. One explanation for 
this discrepancy may be the cost of litigating a complex product 
liability claim, which may discourage plaintiffs (or their attorneys) 
from fully pursuing these claims for less-than-severe injuries.189
The statistical picture with respect to specific injury types is 
more mixed. For fatal-injury cases with verdicts in favor of the 
plaintiff, median awards are more than twice as large in product 
liability as in vehicular negligence; a different analysis by Westlaw’s 
parent company suggests a similar conclusion albeit with lower 
numbers.190 However, for paraplegia and quadriplegia, these awards 
are comparable between vehicular negligence and product liability. 
Moreover, median public settlements for paraplegia are actually 
much higher in vehicular negligence than in product liability. 
Characteristics of the defendant may also affect jury verdicts 
and awards, though both the empirical and the theoretical research on 
this point are mixed. A 1992 study found that juries are more likely 
to find for corporate defendants than for individual defendants but 
also to award somewhat higher damages against those corporate 
defendants that they do hold liable.191 This is broadly consistent with 
the numbers above, although the inclusion of some vehicular 
negligence cases against corporate defendants may obscure a larger 
difference. Other empirical investigations of jury behavior have 
 188. Means are not used here because they tend to be distorted by a few 
massive awards that either reflect additional injuries or largely comprise punitive 
damages.
 189. See Kritzer, supra note 183. 
 190. According to Current Award Trends in Personal Injury, the median 
plaintiff award across all death cases analyzed from 2008 through 2014 is about 
$900,000, while the equivalent across only product liability cases is $1.9 million. 
CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY 6, 19 (55th ed.). 
 191. See Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Roger Hanson, What are Tort 
Awards Really Like? The Untold Story from the State Courts, 14 L. & POL’Y 77, 95 
(1992).
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found evidence of a jury preference for individual defendants over 
corporate defendants.192 Juries may distrust companies, sympathize 
less with these companies, or hold these companies to a higher 
standard193—or not.194 Regardless, the greater perceived wealth of 
corporate defendants apparently did explain this differential 
treatment.195
A comparatively wealthy company, however, is more likely to 
actually be able to pay a large judgment than an individual driver 
with minimum insurance and minimal reachable assets.196 This 
means that even if a plaintiff prevails against an individual defendant 
who is uninsured or underinsured, she may not be able to collect in 
part or in full. In more practical terms, this means that many legally 
viable claims are never brought solely because they are not 
financially viable.197
The experience—or at least the rhetoric—of companies that 
rent or lease motor vehicles also suggests that the aggregate recovery 
for vehicular negligence would be higher if individual driver 
defendants had more reachable assets. “In 2005, Congress passed, 
and the President signed, a multi-billion dollar transportation act that 
contained the Graves Amendment, which prohibits any state from 
holding those in the business of renting or leasing cars liable for 
injuries caused by those cars, absent any negligence on their part.”198
 192. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate 
Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 121, 140 (1996). 
 193. Id. at 140-41. 
 194. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of 
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 342 (1998). 
 195. Compare MacCoun, supra note 192, with Edith Greene, William 
Douglas Woody & Ryan Winter, Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing 
Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 197 (2000), and
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for 
Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 258 (1993). 
 196. See Gilles, supra note 115, at 606; Huang, supra note 115, at 1034-35. 
 197. See Gilles, supra note 115, at 606; see also Walker Smith, supra note 
16, at 36 (advocating a substantial increase in the amount of third-party liability 
insurance required). 
 198. Susan Lorde Martin, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Graves 
Amendment: Implications for the Vicarious Liability of Car Leasing Companies, 18 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 154 (2007). A contemporaneous article in Auto 
Rental News predicted that the day this bill was signed “will go down in history as 
one of the most significant dates in the vehicle rental industry.” Michael LaPlaca, 
What Does the End of Vicarious Liability Mean?, AUTO RENTAL NEWS. (Sept./Oct. 
2005), http://www.autorentalnews.com/channel/fleet-insurance/article/story/2005/09/ 
what-does-the-end-of-vicarious-liability-mean.aspx [https://perma.cc/TCK6-TZR5]. 
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The intent and effect of this provision was to preempt laws in 
perhaps a dozen states,199 especially New York, that imposed some 
form of vicarious liability on these companies for the negligence of 
the individuals who drove their vehicles.200 Various industry 
representatives asserted at the time that this vicarious liability cost 
car rental companies over $100 million annually in judgments and 
settlements.201 In other words, in the states with vicarious liability, 
these corporate defendants may have paid $100 million annually that 
likely could not have been collected from the individual negligent 
drivers.202
The discussion so far has focused on the compensatory 
damages that are intended to make the victim whole. Punitive 
damages, in contrast, are intended in part to punish the defendant for 
morally culpable behavior.203 Analyses of punitive damages reach 
divergent conclusions about their frequency and size. A study by 
Westlaw’s parent notes that “punitive damages accompanied 
compensatory awards in” between 4% and 27% of the cases 
examined from 2008 through 2014,204 which is significantly higher 
 199. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-774, at 13 (2000), https://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CRPT-106hrpt774/html/CRPT-106hrpt774-pt1.htm [https://perma.cc/NP94-
NAR7] (mentioning eleven states); Rental Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (statement of Richard H. Middleton, Jr.), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CHRG-106hhrg60357/html/CHRG-106hhrg60357.htm [https://perma.cc/WQN2-TYKE] 
[hereinafter 1999 Finance and Hazardous Materials Hearing] (referencing that 
twelve states have some form of vicarious liability and five states have full vicarious 
liability). 
 200. See Martin, supra note 198, at 157-58. 
 201. See 1999 Finance and Hazardous Materials Hearing, supra note 199 
(statement of Sharon Faulkner, Area Manager, Premier Car Rental Company). This 
number was also identified in H.R. 1954, which was a precursor to the Graves 
Amendment. H.R. REP. NO. 106-774, at 5. Another witness suggested that this 
liability “amounts to over $200 million per year for this industry.” 1999 Finance and 
Hazardous Materials Hearing, supra note 199, (statement of Raymond T. Wagner, 
Vice President of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Corp.). Opponents of preemption noted 
that the “entire industry had only $100 million in accident costs in 1996,” id.
(statement of Richard H. Middleton, Jr., President, Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am.), 
although this may have referred only to “collision damages,” id. (statement of 
Raymond T. Wagner).
 202. An opponent of preemption did note that, “The auto rental industry has 
decided that they are going to not pursue 40 percent of the claims which they could, 
in fact, pursue for third-party liability. They have made no effort to do so,” though it 
is not clear from this characterization whether these defendants had assets from 
which to recover. Id. (statement of Richard H. Middleton, Jr.). 
 203. See Huang, supra note 115, at 1028, 1035. 
 204. CURRENT AWARD TRENDS, supra note 190, at 20. 
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than in vehicular negligence cases (1%) and all cases (between 2% 
and 5%).205 A study of state court cases in 2005, however, found that 
plaintiffs were awarded punitive damages in only 1% of the product 
liability cases in which they prevailed.206 As a matter of 
constitutional law, punitive damage awards that are many times 
higher than the underlying compensatory award engender particular 
scrutiny from courts.207 Like compensatory awards, punitive awards 
may also be reduced by trial and appeals courts.208
In addition to personal injury, product liability law also 
encompasses some claims on behalf of purchasers of a product who 
were economically but not physically harmed, typically because the 
product fails to conform to explicit or implicit representations made 
about it by its manufacturer or downstream seller.209 In these cases, 
the harm to each individual purchaser may be small, but the 
aggregate injury is much more substantial. Because these purchasers 
are generally similarly situated, they (or an enterprising attorney) 
may litigate collectively through a class action. For example, in 2013 
Toyota agreed to pay over $1 billion to settle a class action alleging 
that the economic value of vehicles had decreased as a result of 
sudden unintended acceleration concerns that had undermined 
Toyota’s claims about safety.210
A more recent (and even more recently dismissed) putative 
class action alleged that several automakers had known “for years” 
that their vehicles “have been (and currently are) susceptible to 
hacking,” that they did not disclose this, and that buyers therefore 
 205. Id. at 7, 9. 
 206. THOMAS H. COHEN & KYLE HARBACEK, U.S. DOJ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4 tbl. 5 (2011), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PV8-F9JD]. 
 207. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 
(2003) (“[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”). 
 208. See Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional Constraints on 
Punitive Damages: Clarity, Consistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1257, 1285-86 (2015) (examining eighteen product liability opinions, finding a 
reduction in median punitive damages from about $16 million to $10 million, and 
noting that these amounts are higher than those found in empirical studies). 
 209. See Larry E. Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss 
Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493, 519 (1978). 
 210. Toyota Economic Loss Settlement, TOYOTA MOTOR CORP.,
https://www.toyotaelsettlement.com [https://perma.cc/WR5S-E9EZ] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2016); Bill Vlasic, Toyota Agrees to Settle Lawsuit Tied to Accelerations,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/business/toyota-
settles-lawsuit-over-accelerator-recalls-impact.html [https://perma.cc/6L5A-LAM7].  
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paid more than those vehicles are worth.211 In this case, the federal 
judge concluded that these claims were unsupported by any evidence 
of personal injury.212 Nonetheless, these claims foreshadow some of 
the technical and legal issues that could accompany the combination 
of increasing automation and increasing connectivity. 
Scholars have examined the product liability implications of 
automated driving for more than two decades.213 Broadly, they 
recognize that shifting the real-time decisions necessary for driving 
 211. Compl. & Demand for Jury Trial, Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 
3:15-cv-01104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015). See also Annie Hunt, Judge Dismisses 
Car Hacking Lawsuit Against Automakers, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Jan. 7, 2016, 10:11 
AM), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510656596-judge-dismisses-car-hacking-lawsuit-
against-automakers [https://perma.cc/35BB-J43J]. 
 212. See Hunt, supra note 211. 
 213. See, e.g., Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: 
The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453 (2013); 
Kevin Funkhouser, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, Products 
Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437 (2013); 
Andrew P. Garza, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and Wrecks in the Age of 
Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581 (2012); Dorothy J. Glancy, Robert 
W. Peterson & Kyle F. Graham, A Look at the Legal Environment for Driverless 
Vehicles, 69 LEGAL RES. DIGEST 1, 3 (2016); Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses 
and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2012) [hereinafter Graham, Of Frightened Horses]; Jeffrey K. 
Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving 
Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247 (2013); F. Patrick 
Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation,
66 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2014); Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming 
Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1321 (2012); Dana M. Mele, The Quasi-Autonomous Car as an Assistive 
Device for Blind Drivers: Overcoming Liability and Regulatory Barriers, 28 
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 26 (2013); Andrew R. Swanson, Comment, 
“Somebody Grab the Wheel!”: State Autonomous Vehicle Legislation and the Road 
to a National Regime, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 1085 (2014); David C. Vladeck, Machines 
Without Principles: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV.
117 (2014); Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777 
(2014) [hereinafter Proximity-Driven Liability]; Stephen S. Wu, Product Liability 
Issues in the U.S. and Associated Risk Management, in AUTONOMOUS FAHREN 575,
576 (2015); JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
research_reports/RR443-2.html [https://perma.cc/S8BT-AG2U]; TOM M. GASSER ET 
AL., BAST-BERICHT, RECHTSFOLGEN ZUNEHMENDER FAHRZEUGAUTOMATISIERUNG, F
83, at 4 (2012); NIDHI KALRA, JAMES ANDERSON, MARTIN WACHS, RAND CORP.,
LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 17 (2009); 
STEPHEN N. ROBERTS ET AL., ADVANCED VEHICLE CONTROL SYSTEMS: POTENTIAL 
TORT LIABILITY FOR DEVELOPERS 1 (1993); JOHN VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS INST.
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from human drivers to automated driving systems (or their human 
designers) means that automotive companies could be liable in a 
much greater share of crashes involving these systems.214 These 
potential defendants could include automotive manufacturers, 
component suppliers, software providers, data providers, fleet 
operators, and infrastructure managers, among others that will make 
up the automated driving industry.215 (This Article often refers to 
“manufacturers” or “developers” as synecdoches for this larger set of 
potential defendants.) 
This decisional shift from human driver to automated driving 
system will significantly increase the importance of product liability 
relative to vehicular negligence. Whereas today’s crash liability 
regime is based largely on the liability of individual drivers under 
negligence,216 tomorrow’s may be premised on the liability of 
manufacturers under product liability broadly. This shift will also 
create new issues for the judges and juries evaluating the resulting 
crash claims—as well as for the lawyers negotiating to avoid such 
trials.
Some of these issues will be threshold questions. The software 
that operates an automated driving system as well as the data used or 
produced by such a system may or may not be products for the 
purposes of product liability law.217 The operator of an automated 
shuttle fleet may or may not be a common carrier subject to a higher 
standard of care.218 Complex business relationships, product 
interactions, and informational supply chains may lead courts to 
expand or limit the duties of some potential defendants.219
 214. See, e.g., Glancy, Peterson & Graham, supra note 213, at 39 (“[T]he 
principal locus of liability for accidents is expected to [eventually] transition away 
from people using these vehicles for transportation and toward the manufacturers of 
these devices and the software used in them.”). 
 215. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected 
Cars—Oh My! First Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 657 (2015). 
 216. States with no-fault insurance regimes have adopted these regimes 
against a background rule of negligence. See Glancy, Peterson & Graham, supra
note 213, at 11.  
 217. See Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173, 199 (1981). 
 218. See, e.g., Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, 
Deregulation & Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 
85 (1996). 
 219. See, e.g., Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 213, at 1797-99. 
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Regardless of the particular theories invoked or the particular 
language used, the argument that the automated driving system in 
question performed unreasonably will be central to many personal 
injury claims. This question of unreasonable performance is likely to 
have two independent prongs: An automated driving system has 
performed unreasonably if either (a) a human driver or (b) a 
comparable automated driving system could have done better under 
the same circumstances.  
This first prong—involving a comparison with a human 
driver—seems to fit most naturally with the consumer expectations 
test still used by some jurisdictions to determine defect under strict 
product liability. After all, a consumer is likely to expect that her 
automated driving system will perform at least as well as she would 
in any given situation. 
This human comparison also matters to the more common risk-
utility test. Under this test, a plaintiff may argue that an automated 
driving system that supplants rather than merely supplements the 
human driver is unreasonable. For the specific type of crash at issue, 
the reasonable alternative design would involve human and machine 
rather than just machine alone. A negligence claim would look 
similar: The occurrence of a crash that a human driver could have 
prevented would be used to suggest that the manufacturer acted 
unreasonably in prematurely marketing an automated driving system 
that operates without human supervision. 
Because manufacturers are likely to imply that their systems 
are at least as safe as human drivers, a contradictory crash may also 
give rise to a misrepresentation claim. Many ex ante arguments about 
safety are likely to be statistical: Crash data, for example, may 
suggest that automated driving is safer overall than conventional 
driving.220 Although the assumption that automated driving is also 
safer in every single situation does not logically follow from such a 
statistical comparison, manufacturers are unlikely to parse this 
difference in their representations. These representations could also 
motivate claims on behalf of entire classes of consumers alleging 
financial rather than physical injury.221
The second prong—involving a comparison with another actual 
or hypothetical automated driving system—will also focus narrowly 
on the particular crash at issue. Here, the risk-utility test for strict 
product liability will ask whether a reasonable change could have 
 220. See BLANCO ET AL., supra note 67, at 40-41. 
 221. See Vlasic, supra note 210. 
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prevented the injury and not whether the automated driving system is 
safer than a human driver on the whole. In other words, whether an 
automated driving system has prevented tens of thousands of injuries 
in other situations will generally be irrelevant to whether that system 
caused the one injury in question. 
New (and old) issues may arise in applying the risk-utility test 
to automated driving systems. The cost of a reasonable alternative 
design that involves changing only a few lines of code may be close 
to zero.222 Probabilistic decision-making and machine learning may 
involve the explicit or implicit weighting of decisional criteria, such 
as the risk of a crash relative to the risk of a travel delay.223 A jury 
may be sympathetic to a plaintiff’s argument that an automated 
driving system (or its developer) should have assigned even higher 
values to safety-relevant inputs.224 Outrage over these values could 
conceivably motivate some juries to impose punitive damages. At 
the same time, for probabilistic systems, the plaintiff may struggle to 
causally connect these values to the actual harm.  
A minor crash between one of Google’s research cars and a 
public bus in February 2016 illustrates these potential challenges.225
While attempting to merge back into a travel lane, the car “detected 
the approaching bus, but predicted that it would yield to us because 
we were ahead of it.”226 Google’s test driver predicted the same and 
therefore did not intervene.227 However, the bus did not yield.228
Following the crash, Google updated its software so that its “cars 
will more deeply understand that buses and other large vehicles are 
less likely to yield to us than other types of vehicles.”229 In other 
words, the updated version of Google’s software is less likely to 
initiate a similar maneuver—but it might still do so. 
The risk-utility test may also demand even better performance 
as automated driving technologies improve. For example, consider a 
 222. See Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 213, at 1801. 
 223. See Walker Smith, supra note 16, at 36-37. 
 224. Id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1043 (1991). 
 225. See Report of Traffic Accident Involving an Autonomous Vehicle, Cal. 
DMV, http://docs.dpaq.de/10437-googleautocrashreportfeb2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X3CF-R7TQ] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 226. Monthly Report: February 2016, GOOGLE SELF-DRIVING CAR PROJECT
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crash at a rural intersection in which the driver of vehicle A 
carelessly runs a stop sign and strikes vehicle B, seriously injuring its 
occupants:
Figure 13 
Under these facts, the driver of vehicle A has clearly acted 
negligently, and the injured occupants of vehicle B should prevail in 
a personal injury claim against her. This driver, however, may have 
minimal liability insurance and minimal assets, in which case the 
injured occupants would likely be unable to actually collect their full 
damages. For this reason (and the other reasons noted above), they 
may look to other potential defendants. 
First imagine that vehicle B had a conventional driver. 
Provided that this driver was behaving responsibly, she is unlikely to 
face any civil liability. Her vehicle was struck by a careless driver 
who failed to yield the right of way. She was not negligent, and her 
fellow occupants would be unlikely to even include her as a 
defendant, much less successfully recover from her. 
But now imagine that vehicle B was operating in a highly 
automated mode. In this case the injured occupants may argue that 
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the automated driving system could and should have recognized that 
vehicle A was not slowing down, predicted that vehicle A would run 
the stop sign, and taken immediate evasive actions. A jury that would 
not expect this kind of expert defensive driving from a human driver 
may nonetheless expect it from an automated driving system. 
Such a conclusion might support a finding that the automated 
driving system was defective. In that case, even if the jury still 
assigns most of the fault to the driver of vehicle A, the injured 
plaintiffs might nonetheless collect some or even all of their damages 
from the manufacturer of vehicle B (or from its relevant suppliers). 
This is similar to crashworthiness claims today in which automakers 
may be liable for injuries caused by the unreasonable performance of 
safety systems in crashes precipitated entirely by driver error.230
A high-profile fatal crash involving Tesla’s so-called autopilot 
system is strikingly similar to this hypothetical.231 In that crash, the 
driver of a truck pulling a trailer apparently turned across a divided 
highway, the Tesla car struck the trailer, and the Tesla driver was 
killed.232 Potential but-for causes may include, among others, a 
failure by the truck driver to yield the right of way, a failure by the 
Tesla driver to brake to avoid striking the trailer, and failures by both 
the autopilot system and a separate automatic braking system to 
recognize the trailer as an obstacle. The presence of these two 
systems has created potential liability for Tesla and its supplier 
where otherwise there may have been none. 
At some point, however, the lack of active safety systems like 
automatic braking may also give rise to product liability for the 
manufacturer. Indeed, NHTSA recently announced that major 
automakers had agreed to make automatic braking standard on their 
vehicles by 2022;233 certainly at and possibly even before this point, a 
jury may conclude that a new vehicle without this feature is defective 
because of the omission. 
It is important to emphasize again that automated emergency 
intervention systems are conceptually distinct from automated 
driving systems.234 This means that the argument that a vehicle 
 230. See Hoenig, supra note 171, at 633-35. 
 231. HWY16FH018, supra note 79. 
 232. Id.
 233. Press Release, NHTSA, U.S. DOT and IIHS Announce Historic 
Commitment of 20 Automakers to Make Automatic Emergency Braking Standard 
on New Vehicles (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/Press-
Releases/nhtsa_iihs_commitment_on_aeb_03172016 [https://perma.cc/65NX-5WTJ]. 
 234. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
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should be equipped with automatic braking is different than the 
argument that a vehicle should be equipped with automated driving 
functionality. If these were the same, then the liability comparison 
would be simpler: Given a choice between facing liability for every 
crash that automation could have prevented and facing liability for 
only a fraction of such crashes (when that automation actually 
failed), automakers would rationally choose the latter. However, in 
any case in which a human driver could have prevented a crash that 
an automated driving system did not, injured plaintiffs may argue 
that the combination of human driver and active safety system is a 
more reasonable design than automated driving without human 
supervision. 
Even so, the complexities of human behavior may actually 
justify greater automation. Active safety systems that merely support 
human driving present difficult human factor issues. A human driver 
who learns that her vehicle’s automatic braking system prevents 
many common crashes may over-rely on that system. Or a driver 
may perceive an imminent crash and, in a panic, fight with her 
vehicle’s automatic emergency steering system in a way that 
exacerbates the situation. At some point, then, removing the human 
entirely from active driving may be safer than managing the “mushy 
middle” of shared human-machine operation. 
This shift could also negate product liability claims that a 
manufacturer did not adequately instruct a driver on how to use an 
active safety system, misrepresented the performance of that system, 
failed to guard against foreseeable misuse of that system, or designed 
that system without reasonably addressing a particular problem with 
human-machine interaction. Active safety and driver assistance 
systems that have already reached the market, including crash-
imminent braking, may eventually give rise to some of these claims. 
Automation could also help automakers reduce their exposure 
to crashworthiness claims.235 Avoiding a “first collision” can prevent 
a “second collision” between the would-be victim and some part of 
the vehicle.236 This will not always be the case; for example, a 
vehicle occupant may still be injured if an automated driving system 
brakes or maneuvers quickly to avoid a crash. However, if automated 
 235. See generally Hoenig, supra note 171 (discussing crashworthiness). 
 236. Id. at 634 n.2. 
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driving systems operate only when all occupants are belted,237 then 
those occupants are less likely to come into contact with other parts 
of the vehicle even in crashes or other instances of sudden 
deceleration. 
Independent of automation, the increasing connectivity of 
modern motor vehicles could also give rise to new claims.238
Automakers and other companies are increasing their “proximity” to 
their products—through technical means such as remote monitoring, 
over-the-air updates, and digital rights management technologies as 
well as legal means such as end user license agreements, subscription 
agreements, and copyright assertions.239 With this greater power may 
come greater responsibility,240 including expanded tort duties and 
higher standards of reasonable care.241 Cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
may be a particularly important driver of new or expanded post-sale 
duties to warn or update. Increased data collection may also give rise 
to obligations and liabilities related to the unauthorized 
dissemination of those data. However, because these potential 
sources of liability depend primarily on connectivity rather than 
automation, they should be included on both sides of a liability 
comparison. 
The mechanics of proving an automated driving-related 
product liability claim may also differ from the mechanics of proving 
a vehicular negligence claim or even a contemporary product 
liability claim. Whether this change favors the plaintiff or defendant 
in a particular case will depend on the particular facts of the crash 
and the particular law of the jurisdiction. On one hand, requiring the 
plaintiff to specifically demonstrate how and why an automated 
driving system performed poorly and should have performed better 
could impose technical and financial barriers to many claims, 
especially those involving comparatively minor injuries. On the other 
hand, permitting the plaintiff to use the consumer expectations test,242
 237. See Bryant Walker Smith, Tesla and Liability, CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y (May 20, 2015, 9:42 AM), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/05/tesla-
and-liability [https://perma.cc/T3LF-BUVF]. 
 238. See generally Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 213, 1779-80. 
 239. See id. at 1779-86. 
 240. See With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, QUOTE 
INVESTIGATOR (July 23, 2015), http://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/07/23/great-power/ 
[https://perma.cc/5NA3-NKLR] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 241. Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 213, at 1779. 
 242. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
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the malfunction doctrine,243 or res ipsa loquitur244 could make it easier 
to attribute undesirable outcomes to something within the automated 
driving system. In that case, the defendant automaker, rather than the 
plaintiff, might offer a more detailed explanation of the automated 
driving system’s performance in order to shift some costs to other 
parties.
Data will be essential to many of these claims. Specific 
information about the crash may be stored in components of the 
automated driving system that are on the vehicle, in other systems on 
board the vehicle, in other vehicles or devices, or in offboard systems 
accessible to entities that may or may not be party to the case. 
Collecting, processing, and interpreting these data may be expensive. 
In some cases, these data provide unprecedented clarity about the 
actual causes of a particular crash. Indeed, a jury may be able to 
simply watch a complete recreation of the crash—although such 
cases would be highly unlikely to actually reach a jury on any 
question other than damages. In other cases, however, these data 
could actually produce more ambiguity and argumentation. For 
example, in one case a defendant automaker argued that its own data 
event recorder was not reliable—and it won.245
Because of all the theoretical and practical considerations 
discussed in this section, predictions about the effect on aggregate 
damages are largely speculative. If recovery rates and damage 
awards remain constant, then a shift from driver liability to product 
liability would mean that plaintiffs would generally pursue only 
claims involving significant injuries, that they would recover at a 
lower rate, and that those who did prevail would receive somewhat 
higher damages. Eventually, a larger body of settlements would 
come to reflect these benchmarks trials.246
Developers of automated driving systems and automotive 
insurance companies will play early and important roles in 
establishing expectations regarding recovery. Some developers may 
readily recognize instances of clear product failure and quickly 
 243. See David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 
282 (1998). 
 244. See id. at 280. 
 245. See, e.g., McAlonan v. Tracy, No. L-487-05, 2011 WL 6125, at *6-8 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 16, 2010) (accepting the defendant automaker’s 
argument that the data from its own data recorder are not reliable). 
 246. See Glancy, Peterson & Graham, supra note 213, at 40 (describing stage 
three of personal injury litigation); Graham, Of Frightened Horses, supra note 213, 
at 1269-70. 
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compensate those who suffer physical harm or property damage. 
(Others may not.247) Automotive insurers, as well as others that cover 
crash losses,248 will face decisions about how to treat early automated 
driving claims and, in the event of payment, whether to subrogate 
those claims against potential defendants.249 Proactive developers and 
insurers may even partner with each other to fully utilize the existing 
claims processing infrastructure250 and to capture the savings realized 
by avoiding product liability litigation.251
Figure 14 illustrates how the role of product liability in 
compensating the victims of motor vehicle crashes may expand in 
the future. As the pie on the left shows, motor vehicle manufacturers 
and associated companies pay only a small proportion of the costs 
associated with crashes. In the future, however, companies 
associated with automated driving are likely to be liable for a much 
greater share of the costs of crashes involving automated driving 
systems. As discussed previously, however, the hope is that total 
crash costs will decrease as crash magnitude decreases.252
 247. See, e.g., Jeff S. Bartlett & Michelle Naranjo, Guide to the Volkswagen 
Emissions Recall, CONSUMER REPORTS, (July 25, 2016), http:// 
www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/guide-to-the-volkswagen-dieselgate-emissions-
recall [https://perma. cc/UC46-J9JP] (describing Volkswagen’s emissions control 
system fraud); Jennifer Chu, Study: Volkswagen’s Emissions Cheat to Cause 60 
Premature Deaths in U.S., MIT NEWS (Oct. 28, 2015), https://news.mit.edu/2015/ 
volkswagen-emissions-cheat-cause-60-premature-deaths-1029 [https://perma.cc/X4U7-
8VZQ] (describing the continued threat to public health caused by this fraud); Anton 
R. Valukas, Report to Board of Directors of General Motors Company Regarding 
Ignition Switch Recalls, JENNER & BLOCK (May 29, 2014), https://s3.amazonaws. 
com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1183508/g-m-internal-investigation-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2YL5-NMBE] (describing GM’s evolving legal position toward 
victims of crashes involving fault ignition switches). 
 248. See, e.g., Alexa Laborda Nelson, Lien & Mean: Changes in Medicaid 
Subrogation Law Greatly Expand the Government’s Right to Settlement Proceeds,
POST & SCHELL: E-FLASH (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.postschell.com/publications/ 
781-lien-mean-changes-medicaid-subrogation-law-greatly-expand-governments [https:// 
perma.cc/CT68-CZ52]. 
 249. See generally, e.g., Glancy, Peterson & Graham, supra note 213, at 47; 
Robert Peterson, New Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and 
California’s Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2012). 
 250. Volvo Cars already markets automotive insurance to consumers in the 
United Kingdom. Volvo Car Insurance, VOLVO CARS UK, http://www.volvocars. 
com/uk/buy/sales/volvo-car-insurance [https://perma.cc/4PM7-WQRJ] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2016). 
 251. See Kritzer, supra note 183, at 27-28 (describing the high costs of 
litigation). 
 252. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 14
In short, the companies that develop and deploy automated 
driving systems are likely to have a bigger slice of what will 
hopefully be a smaller pie of total crash liability. For the reasons 
discussed above, this slice could be disproportionately larger than the 
actual contribution of these systems to crashes, particularly when 
interactions between automated driving systems and conventional 
drivers are routine. Figure 15 illustrates this possibility by 
juxtaposing the pie charts for crash magnitude (Figure 9) and crash 
cost (Figure 14): 
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Figure 15 
The smaller pies in the foreground represent crash magnitude 
(with the darker slices representing product failure),253 while the 
larger pies in the background represent crash costs (with the darker 
slices representing product liability). 
In addition, manufacturers of conventional motor vehicles may 
eventually incur liability for crashes that are caused by the lack of 
active safety systems or by the interaction of these systems with 
human drivers. Figure 16 shows this possibility through the addition 
of a red slice on the left: 
 253. See supra Parts on PRODUCT FAILURE and CRASHES, INJURIES, AND 
FATALITIES.
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Figure 16
As Figure 17 illustrates, it is unclear at this point how total 
product liability will compare as between conventional and 
automated driving. A small slice of a big pie (as is the case for 
conventional driving) may be smaller or larger than a big slice of a 
small pie (as may be true in the case of automated driving).  
Figure 17
As the next Part discusses, it is important to distinguish this 
uncertainty about liability from the actual exposure to liability.  
 Automated Driving & Product Liability 57 
CONSUMER COST
Driving is expensive. The average price of a new motor vehicle 
today is nearly $35,000.254 The annual total cost of owning a vehicle 
is about $0.57 per mile, which is equivalent to $8,600 per year.255 In 
comparison, a typical UberX ride in Atlanta might cost $1.13 per 
mile,256 which is equivalent to $12,000 per year.257 The cost of 
ownership includes average automotive insurance costs of $840258 to 
$1,200.259 The same survey that produced this lower figure found 
average annual expenditures of $520 on third-party liability coverage 
and $300 on collision coverage.260
The price of automated driving products and services will 
reflect the product liability exposure of that industry. An extremely 
rough estimation exercise can offer an order-of-magnitude sense of 
this added cost in the United States. The exercise explicitly (and 
crudely) assumes that: 
 254. The “average transaction price” for light vehicle sales in December 
2015 was $34,428. Press Release, Kelly Blue Book, Record New-Car Transaction 
Prices Reported in December 2015, According to Kelly Bluebook (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://mediaroom.kbb.com/record-new-car-transaction-prices-reported-december-2015 
[https://perma.cc/8575-MG4T]. 
 255. Press Release, AAA, Your Driving Costs (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://newsroom.aaa.com/auto/your-driving-costs [https://perma.cc/3ME5-6MJ9] 
[hereinafter AAA Driving Costs 2016]. Similarly, the Internal Revenue Service’s 
standard mileage rate for business miles driven is 57.5 cents for 2015 and 54 cents for 
2016. Press Release, IRS, 2016 Standard Mileage Rates for Business, Medical and 
Moving Announced (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/2016-standard-
mileage-rates-for-business-medical-and-moving-announced [https://perma.cc/XG2T-
QF7A]. 
 256. Atlanta Uber Prices, UBERESTIMATE.COM, http://uberestimate.com/ 
prices/Atlanta/ [https://perma.cc/SM7X-ARJC] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (noting 
fees of about $2.75 and charges of $0.12 per minute and $0.75 per mile). Cf. Press 
Release, AAA, New Study Reveals When, Where and How Much Motorists Drive 
(Apr. 16, 2015), http://newsroom.aaa.com/2015/04/new-study-reveals-much-motorists-
drive/ [https://perma.cc/2RAE-BM5P] [hereinafter AAA Study] (“On average, 
Americans drive 29.2 miles per day, making two trips with an average total duration 
of 46 minutes.”). 
 240. “Motorists age 16 years and older drive, on average, 29.2 miles per day 
or 10,658 miles per year.” AAA Study, supra note 256. 
 258. Auto Insurance, supra note 153. 
 259. AAA Driving Costs 2016, supra note 255. 
 260. Auto Insurance, supra note 153. 
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(1) Developers, manufacturers, suppliers, and operators of 
automated driving systems pay 54% of total societal crash 
costs. (Insurers currently cover 54% of the $242 billion in 
economic costs.261 Using total costs rather than just 
economic costs allows for the possibility that crash victims 
and the entities that insure them will recover far more of 
their damages, particularly for pain and suffering, in a 
product liability-based regime than in the current vehicular 
negligence-based regime.) 
(2) These costs would equal $975 billion annually without 
automated driving. (This higher figure262 represents a 
rough attempt to account for the increase in crash deaths263
and the change in the value of a dollar between 2010 and 
2015.264)
(3)  Legal expenses continue to account for only 1.3% of these 
costs.265 (In other words, recovery through a product 
liability-based regime is no more expensive than recovery 
through a vehicular negligence-based regime.) 
(4) Automakers sell 17,500,000 light-duty vehicles 
annually,266 100% of which have permanently engaged 
automated driving systems.267 (In other words, vehicle 
sales do not change even if most vehicles are sold or 
transferred to fleets rather than to individuals.) 
(5)  There are 260,000,000 total registered vehicles,268 100% of 
which have permanently engaged automated driving 
 261. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 1, 13. 
 262. See supra discussion at note 103. 
 263. There were about 7% more crash deaths in 2015 than in 2010. See supra 
note 55 and accompanying text. 
 264. On the basis of purchasing power parity, $1 in 2010 is equivalent to 
about $1.09 in 2015, though other bases give a range of $1.09 to $1.21. Samuel H. 
Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 
1774 to Present, MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ 
[https://perma.cc/8KYD-XVKH] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 265. BLINCOE ET AL., supra note 26, at 16. 
 266. Mike Spector, Jeff Bennett & John D. Stoll, U.S. Car Sales Set Record 
in 2015, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-car-sales-poised-
for-their-best-month-ever-1451999939 [https://perma.cc/3QHG-LSVC]. 
 267. See supra INTRODUCTION.
 268. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TABLE 1-11: NUMBER OF U.S. AIRCRAFT,
VEHICLES, VESSELS, AND OTHER CONVEYANCES, http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/ 
rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_1
1.html [https://perma.cc/FPJ3-QZN4] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
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systems.269 (In other words, the total fleet size does not 
change.)
(6) These vehicles travel 3.15 trillion vehicle miles 
annually,270 which is equivalent to 11,300 miles per light-
duty vehicle.271 (In other words, total vehicle miles 
traveled do not change.) 
(7) These assumptions are independent of the business models 
identified below. 
These assumptions are extremely rough and subject to 
significant criticism. The assignment of 54% of total societal crash 
costs to automotive companies, for example, is essentially arbitrary. 
Moreover, if only economic costs were used rather than total societal 
costs, the resulting cost estimates would be just one third as large. 
However, the larger numbers are used to reflect the possibility of 
greater compensation under a product liability-based regime.272
The exercise further posits four safety scenarios: 
(1)  Baseline: Automated driving does not reduce total crash 
costs.
(2) Moderate: Automated driving reduces total crash costs by 
20%.  
(3) Ambitious: Automated driving reduces total crash costs by 
50%. 
(4) Exceptional: Automated driving reduces total crash costs 
by 80%. 
Finally, this exercise identifies four potential business models: 
(1) Sale: A manufacturer sells its vehicles at a price that 
covers all of the liability costs that it incurs that year. (In 
other words, the manufacturer relies on new sales to cover 
existing liabilities.) 
(2) Lease: A manufacturer leases its vehicles at a price that, 
over five years, covers all of the liability costs that it incurs 
that first year.273
 269. See supra INTRODUCTION.
 270. See 2015 TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS, supra note 78. 
 271. AAA uses 15,000 miles per vehicle per year. AAA Driving Costs 2016, 
supra note 255. 
 272. See supra notes 186, 190 and accompanying text. 
 273. The average lease term is about thirty-six months, and the average loan 
term is about sixty-seven months. See Melinda Zabritski, State of the Automotive 
Finance Market: First Quarter 2015, EXPERIAN, at 13, 27 (2015), https:// 
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(3) Subscription: A manufacturer makes its automated driving 
system available to users for a monthly or yearly fee that 
covers all of the liability costs that it incurs over that 
period.274
(4) Service: A manufacturer makes its vehicles available to 
users for a charge per vehicle mile traveled (VMT) that 
covers all of the liability costs that it incurs over that 
mile.275
Figure 18 shows the rough resulting product liability cost estimates 
for these four models. 
Figure 18 
















for 5 years 










$1,900 $1,500 $950 $380 
Per VMT $0.17 $0.13 $0.08 $0.03 
Many of these numbers are large, but not extraordinarily so. 
Under the ambitious safety scenario, the product liability costs range 
from about 11% of annual vehicle ownership costs (with the service 
www.experian.com/assets/automotive/white-papers/experian-auto-2015-q1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7ZTU-GT4U]. 
 274. See, e.g., Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 213, at 1817. 
 275. See id. 
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model) to about 40% of annual vehicle ownership costs (with the 
lease model).276
The numbers appear most dramatic for the sales model, 
because that model spreads hundreds of billions of dollars of crash 
costs among the relatively few consumers who purchase a new 
vehicle in any given year. The lease model also spreads these costs 
among new vehicle buyers, but it reflects the reality that the vast 
majority of these buyers actually rely on financing, including both 
loans and leases.277 Incidentally, automakers already tend to rely at 
least in part on the sale of their new vehicles to cover the liability 
costs associated with their old vehicles,278 which means that liability 
and other legacy costs related to vehicles sold years prior could 
conceivably disadvantage these companies as they compete with new 
entrants to the automotive or transportation markets.279
The subscription and service models further spread these costs, 
and, because of the assumptions used, are roughly equivalent. If 
automated driving enables current trips to be serviced by fewer total 
 276. See AAA Driving Costs 2016, supra note 255. AAA’s annual vehicle 
costs assume 15,000 miles per vehicle per year, id., which is somewhat higher than 
the 11,300 miles per year used for the annual cost of the service model.
 277. See Zabritski, supra note 273, at 6-7. Nearly 85% of new vehicle 
purchases in the first quarter of 2015 involved financing. Id. at 6. 
 278. Compare, e.g., Ford Motor Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at FS-70 
(Feb. 3, 2015), https://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2014-15/doc/ 
sr14-form-10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CPR-YBMR] (“We accrue for [litigation] 
matters when losses are deemed probable and reasonably estimable . . . [taking] into 
consideration factors such as our historical experience with matters of a similar 
nature, the specific facts and circumstances asserted, the likelihood that we will 
prevail, and the severity of any potential loss. We reevaluate and update our accruals 
as matters progress over time. For the majority of matters, which generally arise out 
of alleged defects in our products, we establish an accrual based on our extensive 
historical experience with similar matters.”), with id. at FS-71 (“We accrue 
obligations for warranty costs and field service actions (i.e., safety recalls, emission 
recalls, and other product campaigns) at the time of sale. We establish estimates for 
warranty and field service action obligations using a patterned estimation model 
using historical information regarding the nature, frequency, and average cost of 
claims for each vehicle line by model year.”). 
 279. Cf. Matthias Holweg, The Evolution of Competition in the Automotive 
Industry, in BUILD TO ORDER: THE ROAD TO THE 5-DAY CAR 13, at 21-22 (Glenn 
Parry & Andrew Peter Graves eds., 2008) (discussing legacy costs related 
principally to pension obligations); A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the 
Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 
563 (2010) (describing how the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies addressed these 
obligations).
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vehicles,280 then the per-vehicle cost of the subscription model may 
be higher than estimated. Unlike that model, the service model can 
charge liability costs to each vehicle mile traveled, and the charge for 
a particular mile could even reflect the crash risk of that mile. 
When the average annual expenditure for automotive liability 
insurance is subtracted from the estimates in Figure 18, these 
numbers become even more interesting. In 2013, this expenditure 
was about $520 per vehicle.281 Figure 19 shows the resulting 
estimates. (The upfront cost of the pure sale model, which is 
essentially unchanged, does not reflect the present value of the 
lifetime insurance savings.) 
Figure 19 
Model Baseline Moderate Ambitious Exceptional 
(-0%) (-20%) (-50%) (-80%) 
Sale $29,500  $23,500  $14,500  $5,500  
Lease $6,500  $5,000  $3,000  $900  
Subscription $1,500  $1,100  $500  ($100) 
Service $1,400  $1,000  $400  ($150) 
$0.12  $0.09  $0.04  ($0.01) 
Under the ambitious safety scenario, the product liability costs 
range from about 5% of annual vehicle ownership costs (with the 
service model) to about 34% of annual vehicle ownership costs (with 
the lease model). Strikingly, under the exceptional safety scenario, 
the subscription and service models may even product a net cost 
savings.
Automated driving may have other benefits that reduce its cost 
relative to conventional driving. A particularly significant example 
relates to the value of time. If automated driving allows vehicle users 
to reallocate 80% of their travel time at $18 per hour,282 these users 
 280. UNIV. OF MICH. TRANSP. RES. INST., Driverless Vehicles: Fewer Cars, 
More Miles (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.umtri.umich.edu/what-were-doing/news/ 
driverless-vehicles-fewer-cars-more-miles [https://perma.cc/3V9U-2NBF]. 
 281. Auto Insurance, supra note 153. 
 282. TEX. A&M TRANS. INST., 2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard, at app. A-14 
(2015), https://d2dtl5nnlpfr0r.cloudfront.net/tti.tamu.edu/documents/mobility-scorecard-
2015-appx-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y44A-ZX8M] (using $17.67 per person-hour in 
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could potentially “save” $4,000 per year,283 which is equivalent to 
$0.38 per mile.284 The potential consumer savings are much more 
tangible in the case of an automated taxi or ridesharing system. 
Recall that a typical UberX ride in Atlanta might cost $1.13 per 
mile.285 An UberX driver might earn about 75% of this fare.286 This 
means that automating that driver’s job could result in a cost savings 
of $0.85 per mile.287
These additional consumer savings (as well as any additional 
consumer costs) are relevant to the practical impact of product 
liability but not to the theoretical impact of product liability. If these 
savings are significant, then automated driving could be cheaper and 
hence more attractive than conventional driving even if product 
liability costs are higher. In that case, however, automated driving 
would be even cheaper and hence even more attractive without those 
higher liability costs. From a safety perspective, this may be an 
important distinction. 
Of course, all of these numbers are incredibly rough estimates, 
and the actual consumer costs of product liability could be many 
times higher or lower. This uncertainty provides another argument 
for the subscription and service models. As the developer of an 
automated driving system learns more about the technical 
performance and liability implications of that system, it can adjust 
2014 dollars); Memorandum from Carlos Monje, Assistant Secretary for 
Transportation Policy, to Secretarial Officers & Modal Administrators (2015), at tbl. 
4, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Revised%20Departmental% 
20Guidance%20on%20Valuation%20of%20Travel%20Time%20in%20Economic%20
Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYA3-8KMB] (recommending values ranging from 
$12.50 per person-hour for local personal automotive travel to $24.40 for business 
automotive travel of any type in 2013 dollars). 
 283. “On average, Americans drive 29.2 miles per day [or 10,658 miles per 
year], making two trips with an average total duration of 46 minutes.” AAA Study, 
supra note 256. 46 minutes/day * 365 days * 80% * $18/hour = $4,029.60.
 284. $4,029.60 / 10,658 miles/year = $0.37808/mile.
 285. Atlanta Uber Prices, supra note 256 (noting fees of about $2 and 
charges of $0.12 per minute and $0.75 per mile). The calculation assumes a ten-mile 
trip that lasts fifteen minutes for an average speed of forty miles per hour. Cf. AAA 
Study, supra note 256 (“On average, Americans drive 29.2 miles per day, making 
two trips with an average total duration of 46 minutes.”). $2 + ($0.75 * 10) + ($0.12 
* 15) / 10 = $1.13 per mile. 
 286. Ellen Huet, Uber Now Taking Its Biggest UberX Commission Ever—25 
Percent, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2014, 1:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/ 
2014/09/22/uber-now-taking-its-biggest-uberx-commission-ever-25-percent/. 
 287. $1.13/mile * 75% = $0.8475. Of course, this also means that this driver 
will have lost her job. 
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what it charges per month or per mile.288 In this way, uncertainty 
need not mean inaction.289
Several key companies—including traditional automakers like 
Ford and General Motors—are already pursuing the service model.290
Reasons for this may include a desire for more control over the 
automated driving systems, greater price flexibility, lower perceived 
consumer cost, and increased access to the users. The service model, 
particularly its per-mile cost, is the focus of the remaining analysis. 
CONSUMER ADOPTION
This Part considers the impact of a shift from a driver 
negligence-based personal injury regime to a product liability-based 
personal injury regime on consumer adoption of automated driving 
systems. To the extent that automated driving is safer than 
conventional driving, this adoption will presumably advance the 
societal goal of safety.291
At the outset, it is important to recognize that compensation is 
also a societal goal that could be affected by automated driving. As 
summarized earlier, this regime shift might mean that plaintiffs 
would generally pursue only claims involving significant injuries, 
that they would recover at a lower rate, and that those who did 
prevail would receive somewhat higher damages.292
The question explored here, however, is whether product 
liability exposure or uncertainty could delay or diminish widespread 
adoption of automated driving systems. There are at least three steps 
to this adoption: Companies need to develop and then market these 
systems, after which consumers to buy or otherwise use them. 
Dire predictions that product liability will thwart innovation 
should—and can—be put in perspective. In 1993, the Federal 
 288. See Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 213, at 1817-19. 
 289. Id.
 290. See, e.g., Lisa Eadicicco, Uber’s First Self-Driving Car Is Hitting the 
Streets, TIME (May 19, 2016), http://time.com/4341517/uber-first-self-driving-car/ 
[https://perma.cc/T69J-BTMD]; Mike Ramsey & Gautham Nagesh, GM, Lyft to Test 
Self-Driving Electric Taxis, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2016, 10:54 AM), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/gm-lyft-to-test-self-driving-electric-taxis-1462460094 [https://perma.cc/ 
P366-ABDC]; Hope Reese, Ford Plans to Mass Produce a ‘No Driver Required’ 
Autonomous Vehicle by 2021, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 16, 2016, 12:10 PM), http:// 
www.techrepublic.com/article/ford-plans-to-mass-produce-a-no-driver-required-
autonomous-vehicle-by-2021/ [https://perma.cc/QT4J-AD53]. 
 291. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
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Highway Administration commissioned a report on tort liability 
faced by developers of “advanced vehicle control systems” 
(AVCS).293 The report concluded that “[t]he prospect of liability for 
catastrophic accidents resulting from a failure of AVCS will likely 
deter entities from becoming involved with AVCS and impede its 
development unless the federal government adopts some or all of the 
legislative” limits on liability discussed in the report.294 These limits 
ranged from restricting damages to eliminating some or even all tort 
claims.295
At the time,296 the prediction that product liability would deter 
companies from releasing advanced driver assistance systems and 
from researching even more advanced forms of driving automation 
was understandable—and difficult to disprove. In the intervening 
two decades, however, traditional automotive manufacturers have 
widely released many of these systems,297 while they and others have 
invested heavily in automated driving.298 These companies have done 
so without receiving special exemptions from the generally 
applicable product liability regimes of each state. (Product liability 
law has changed over the last two decades, including in many ways 
more favorable to product sellers.299 However, few of these changes 
are as dramatic as the liability limitations discussed in the 1993 
report.300)
In other words, remarkable innovation in the automotive 
industry seems to have refuted this prediction. Moreover, because of 
the tremendous progress in automated driving, the assertion that 
 293. ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 213, at 1. 
 294. Id. at 57. 
 295. Id. at 48-57. 
 296. Notably, the 1990s were a peak of the “tort reform” movement. See, 
e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 469-70 (2006); John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 
Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1021, 1022 (2005) (“The 1994 Republican ‘Contract with America’ promised 
Americans that, if Republicans took control of Congress, one of ten key agenda 
items would be changing the civil justice system.”). 
 297. See MYCARDOESWHAT.ORG, https://mycardoeswhat.org/ [https://perma.cc/ 
FKS4-YMB9] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 298. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 290; Rob Toews, Investment Opportunities 
in the Autonomous Vehicle Space, TECHCRUNCH (June 11, 2016), https://techcrunch. 
com/2016/06/11/investment-opportunities-in-the-autonomous-vehicle-space/ [https:// 
perma.cc/RH6E-NFC7]. 
 299. See, e.g., supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text (discussing 
punitive damages). 
 300. See generally ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 213. 
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liability will deter the introduction of highly automated driving 
systems can be tested in a way that was not possible twenty years 
ago: If a developer of such a system is reluctant to release it, that 
developer can simply point to its production-ready system and 
promise to release it if and only if particular rules of liability are 
changed.  
Rather than demand such changes, several prominent 
companies have publicly “accepted” current product liability law. 
Volvo Cars has stated in a press release that it “will accept full 
liability whenever one of its cars is in autonomous mode.”301 Google 
and Daimler have both accepted that they will be liable if their 
respective technologies are at fault.302 These statements are not 
revolutionary declarations as much as they are simple 
acknowledgements of existing law.303 They also do not necessarily 
resolve difficult questions of fault, causation, and damages. And to 
the extent that these statements function as product representations, 
they also raise a fascinating product liability question in their own 
right.304 Regardless, such acknowledgments implicitly refute the 
notion that current product liability law is an absolute bar to 
automated driving. 
The experience—or merely the continued existence—of the 
larger transportation industry is also instructive. In tort law, a person 
who causes a crash by negligently driving a vehicle is generally 
liable to the victim of that crash. Under some circumstances, 
however, the employer of that driver or the owner of that vehicle 
may also be vicariously liable to the victim even if the driver was the 
 301. Press Release, Volvo Car Group, US Urged to Establish Nationwide 
Federal Guidelines for Autonomous Driving (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.media. 
volvocars.com/global/en-gb/media/pressreleases/167975/us-urged-to-establish-
nationwide-federal-guidelines-for-autonomous-driving [https://perma.cc/WT72-9ZL7] 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 302. See Bill Whitaker, Hands Off the Wheel, CBS NEWS 60 MINUTES (Oct. 
4, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/self-driving-cars-google-mercedes-benz-60-
minutes/ [https://perma.cc/BG7T-Q3J2]. 
 303. These companies are essentially saying that they will be liable when 
they are liable. Future plaintiffs may disagree with these companies, however, on the 
specifics of the particular incident, including the meaning of defect, the existence of 
causation, and the extent of damages. See infra notes 307-10 and accompanying 
text. 
 304. In short: Might a consumer purchase or use an automated driving 
system in reliance on a promise by the developer that it will assume liability in the 
event of a crash? If so, the developer’s refusal to promptly compensate a crash 
victim might give rise to an argument of equitable estoppel and a separate claim for 
misrepresentation—by the crash victim and, conceivably, the entire class of buyers. 
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only negligent actor.305 This vicarious liability is at least as “strict” as 
product liability.306
As noted earlier, the automotive leasing and rental industry 
successfully sought federal preemption of their vicarious liability for 
the negligence of individuals driving those vehicles.307 At the time, 
this industry characterized vicarious liability as an existential 
threat—one which “has put literally hundreds of small operators out 
of business in States such as New York and other States across the 
country.”308 This argument seems extreme: A decade earlier, one 
major rental company noted that its cost for all liability settlements, 
including those for vicarious liability, “amounted to 8 to 11 percent 
of [its] annual revenues in the last few years,”309 which is comparable 
to what the average motorist pays for liability insurance as a 
percentage of the total cost of vehicle ownership.310
Vicarious liability persists in other contexts. Notwithstanding 
the Graves Amendment,311 motor carriers312 and taxicab companies313
 305. The employer or vehicle owner can also be liable for negligently 
maintaining the vehicle or negligently entrusting it to the driver. In these cases, 
however, the employer or vehicle owner is actually negligent itself. 
 306. See James Fleming, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 172 
(1954).
 307. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Martin, 
supra note 198, at 162; William Sprouse, Grave Danger? Concerns and Possible 
Solutions for Individuals Injured by Drivers of Leased Vehicles, 15 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 209, 226-27 (2010); Brent Steinberg, The Graves 
Amendment: Putting to Death Florida’s Strict Vicarious Liability Law, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 795, 799 (2010). 
 308. 1999 Finance and Hazardous Materials Hearing, supra note 199. 
 309. Matthew L. Wald, Further Limits on Car Renters, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/11/business/further-limits-on-car-renters.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9XG-HWKB]. In a potential victory for safety, vicarious liability 
had apparently also persuaded that company to ask its renters if they had been 
convicted of drunk driving before giving them the keys. Id.
 310. In 2013, the average expenditure for liability insurance was $518.49, 
and the average cost of ownership for a medium sedan was $5,987. See Auto 
Insurance, supra note 153; YOUR DRIVING COSTS, AAA 6-7 (2013 ed.), 
http://exchange.aaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Your-Driving-Costs-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9F6X-Y6LS] ($518.49 / $5,987 = 8.7%).
 311. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012) (“An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or 
leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under 
the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of 
the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results 
or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of 
the rental or lease, if—(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the 
trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence 
68 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
can be liable for the negligence of the drivers to whom they lease 
their equipment. Delivery companies can also be liable for the 
negligence of their drivers314—or even their lessors’ drivers.315 As a 
general matter, companies are liable for the negligence of their 
employees acting within the scope of employment.316 The questions 
of who is an employee317 and what is within the scope of 
employment318 can require fact-specific determinations, and courts 
may reach different conclusions. 
For companies that are in the business of using public roads, 
vicarious liability for the crashes negligently caused by their drivers 
is often part of that business. They pass the cost of this liability onto 
their customers through the prices charged for rides or packages or 
pizzas. Nonetheless, people continue to buy rides, packages, and 
pizzas. 
A service model for automated driving would likewise pass the 
costs of product liability onto the users of that automated driving 
service. Recall that, for the ambitious safety scenario (which assumes 
a 50% reduction in crash costs), the resulting product liability cost 
was very roughly estimated at between four and eight cents per 
mile.319
Fuel prices provide another point of reference for liability costs 
under the service model. Figure 20 shows that the fuel cost to travel 
one mile has, when adjusted for both inflation and changes in 
or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).”); see 
also Vargas v. FMI, Inc., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 804-05 (2015). 
 312. See generally R. Clay Porter & Elenore Cotter Klingler, The Mythology 
of Logo Liability: An Analysis of Competing Paradigms of Lease Liability for Motor 
Carriers, 33 TRANSP. L.J. 1 (2006). 
 313. Kindard-Jennings v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., No. CV126037331, 2013 
WL 4046584, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2013). 
 314. See, e.g., Arenas v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 34201000070698, 
2012 WL 1418637 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2012) (Verdict and Summary 
Settlement) (“Defendants UPS conceded vicarious liability for the accident.”); 
Studer v. DHL Exp. (USA), Inc., 767 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009); Morris v. 
JTM Materials, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. App. 2002). 
 315. See, e.g., Horner v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 258 S.W.3d 532 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 316. See Fleming, supra note 306, at 178. 
 317. See, e.g., Viado v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 217 P.3d 199 (Or. Ct. App. 
2009).
 318. See, e.g., Carlson v. Porter, 861 N.Y.S.2d 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 319. See supra notes 273-82 and accompanying text. Four cents per mile 
excludes the current average cost of liability insurance. Eight miles includes it. 
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average fuel economy, varied between eight cents and eighteen cents 
since 1990.320
Figure 20 
Even if this price variation affects other spending decisions, it 
seems to have had little effect on vehicle miles actually traveled.321
Figure 21 shows the relationship between real fuel cost and VMT per 
capita on an annual basis between 1990 and 2015.322
 320. See SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 
7, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/realprices/ [https://perma.cc/MDX5-2PZ7] 
[hereinafter EIA GAS PRICES] (depicting gas prices); TABLE 4-23: AVERAGE FUEL 
EFFICIENCY OF U.S. LIGHT DUTY VEHICLES, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http:// 
www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation
_statistics/html/table_04_23.html [https://perma.cc/VX5L-34YV] (last visited Nov. 
16, 2016) (average fuel efficiency) (showing that fuel efficiency in 2015 is assumed 
to be equal to fuel efficiency in 2014). 
 321. See also Michael Morris, Gasoline Prices Tend to Have Little Effect on 
Demand for Car Travel, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.eia. 
gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19191 [https://perma.cc/HU9K-PVDK]. Cf. LISA 
ECOLA & MARTIN WACHS, RAND CORP., EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
TRAVEL DEMAND AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2012), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ 
otps/pubs/vmt_gdp/ [https://perma.cc/GD59-ABAJ] (report prepared for the Federal 
Highway Administration). 
 322. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ALTERNATIVE FUELS DATA CTR., ANNUAL 
VEHICLE MILES TRAVELED IN THE U.S. (2015), http://www.afdc.energy.gov/data/ 
10315 (VMT); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES: HISTORICAL DATA,
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Figure 21 
This comparison both requires and contains some caution. The 
choice between traveling and not traveling is different from the 
choice between driving and riding: An employee who needs to 
commute to her office probably does not need to do so in an 
automated taxi.323 Furthermore, swings in the price of fuel hardly go 
unnoticed, and an increase in the cost of travel of eight cents per mile 
(before any offsetting savings) is equivalent to a rise of about $1.70 
in the price of gasoline.324 But this has precedent: It is roughly what 
occurred between 2002 and 2008.325
Again, the consumer costs under all four business models are 
large, but not extraordinarily so. And that is an important point. This 
exercise suggests that large—but not extraordinarily large—charges 
might directly cover more than 50% of total societal crash costs. In a 
hypothetical world with only automated driving, a charge of pennies 
https://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html [https://perma.cc/UU46-
PRMW] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). The coefficient of determination is 0.1525. 
 323. Cf. Morris, supra note 321 (discussing the relative inelasticity of motor 
vehicle travel in the United States). 
 324. $0.08/mile * 21.4 miles/gallon = $1.712/gallon.
 325. See EIA GAS PRICES, supra note 320. 
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per mile might reimburse losses twice as large as those covered by 
the entire automotive insurance industry in 2010.326
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis suggests that automated driving and 
product liability can coexist. In comparison to the automotive 
industry today, the automated driving industry will likely bear a 
bigger slice of a smaller pie of total crash costs. Given substantial 
uncertainty about the size of that slice, this industry may be inclined 
toward service-based business models that provide more flexibility. 
Under such a model, liability exposure could conceivably add 
several cents per mile to travel costs. 
This analysis is a sketch that should be refined as automated 
driving becomes real and, ultimately, routine. As companies move 
their automated driving systems closer to deployment, they will learn 
more about the actual performance of those systems both in absolute 
terms and relative to human drivers. As automotive insurers 
negotiate with manufacturers over subrogated claims involving 
advanced driver assistance systems, both sides will learn more about 
expected litigation and settlement costs. In many cases, 
unfortunately, this information will not reach the public.327
One entity is particularly well positioned to contribute to public 
analysis of these questions. With 215,000 vehicles328 traveling over 
1.2 billion miles annually,329 the United States Postal Service (USPS) 
operates “one of the largest civilian fleets in the world.”330 A USPS 
employee who is injured on the job generally obtains workers 
compensation under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act,331
 326. Auto Insurance, supra note 153 (Incurred Losses for Auto Insurance, 
2011-2015).
 327. Greater transparency in other domains would also be useful to 
understanding these issues. High-speed electronic trading, for example, could 
already offer valuable insight into the legal, technical, and business strategies that 
companies use to manage massive financial risks associated with automated systems 
that operate in complex environments at speeds that preclude effective human 
supervision.
 328. SIZE AND SCOPE, U.S. POSTAL SERV., http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/ 
postal-facts/size-scope.htm [https://perma.cc/F9DZ-TPYY] (last visited Nov. 16, 
2016) [hereinafter SIZE AND SCOPE]. 
 329. 2012 USPS SUSTAINABILITY REPORT: FLEET AND TRANSPORTATION 
MANAGEMENT, U.S. POSTAL SERV., http://about.usps.com/what-we-are-doing/green/ 
report/2012/14.html [https://perma.cc/6MM6-7TCG] (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). 
 330. SIZE AND SCOPE, supra note 328.  
 331. 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (2012). 
72 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
and a member of the public who is injured by the on-the-job 
negligence of one of those 625,000 employees332 generally obtains 
compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act.333 Just as USPS’s 
vast logistics operation could provide insight into the driving 
environment, its legal operation could provide insight into personal 
injury negotiations and settlements. Although USPS is authorized to 
withhold its attorneys’ work product under the Freedom of 
Information Act,334 that statute does not obligate it to do so.335
A clearer public understanding of the state of personal injury 
litigation may be instructive for other cyberphysical systems as well. 
Roadways are far from the only imperfect environment. In addition 
to the 35,000 roadway fatalities, each year there are some 5,000 
deaths from workplace injuries,336 20,000 deaths from home 
injuries,337 and somewhere between 100,000 and 440,000 deaths 
from medical errors.338 In 2014, unintentional poisonings killed 
42,000 people, unintentional falls killed 32,000 people, homicide by 
firearm killed nearly 11,000 people, and suicide by firearm killed 
nearly twice that number.339
 332. SIZE AND SCOPE, supra note 328. Although USPS also uses contractors, 
its employees service “the vast majority of postal carrier routes.” KEVIN R. KOSAR,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42549, THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE’S USE OF CONTRACTORS
TO DELIVER MAIL: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5 (May 29, 2012), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42549.pdf [https://perma.cc/527F-AY6D]. 
 333. See 39 U.S.C. § 409 (1970); General Counsel, TORT CLAIMS, U.S.
POSTAL SERV. (PB 22170) (Dec. 22, 2005), https://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/ 
2005/html/pb22170/a-c4_002.html [https://perma.cc/2NFA-2VRS]. 
 334. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994) (“[I]nter-agency or intra-agency 
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than 
an agency in litigation with the agency . . . .”); see also 110 AM. JUR. Trials 367 § 21 
(2008).
 335. See 110 AM. JUR. Trials 367 § 16 (2008). 
 336. NUMBER OF FATAL WORK INJURIES, 1992-2014, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATS. (2016), http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EDB-
R8GK]. 
 337. THE STATE OF HOME SAFETY IN AMERICA: FACTS ABOUT
UNINTENTIONAL INJURIES IN THE HOME 8 (Carol W. Runyan & Cari Casteel eds., 2d 
ed. 2004), http://www.iccsafe.org/cs/CTC/Documents/guards/resource/guards_Moss_ 
SOHSIA-2004report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H7D-8RKA]. 
 338. Marshall Allen, How Many Die From Medical Mistakes in U.S. 
Hospitals?, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 19, 2013, 10:03 AM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/how-many-die-from-medical-mistakes-in-us-hospitals [https://perma.cc/Q74P-
VSRP]. 
 339. CDC TEN LEADING CAUSES, supra note 23; see also Melonie Heron, 
Deaths: Leading Causes for 2013, 65 NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP. 1, 2 (2016), http:// 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6R3-6LBF]. 
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Whereas deaths and injuries can be recorded and tracked, the 
panoply of unmet needs in society is harder to inventory. From 
sustenance and survival340 to care and companionship,341 many people 
need more. Beyond basic needs, opportunities for (at least arguable) 
improvement also abound. From the body to the home to the sky, 
cyberphysical systems may address or affect these needs and 
opportunities.342 Even some of the 74 million housecats in the United 
States343 may be able to look forward to food,344 water,345 litter,346
medical monitoring,347 and entertainment348 on demand. 
In contrast to automated driving systems, the safety argument 
for some of these cyberphysical systems may be more difficult to 
discern—if there is one. Small unmanned aerial vehicles, for 
example, are not a replacement for particularly dangerous humans 
with wings. But they might substitute for light aircrafts,349 motor 
 340. See HUNGER IN AMERICA: 2016 UNITED STATES HUNGER AND POVERTY 
FACTS, WORLD HUNGER (Oct. 9 2016), http://www.worldhunger.org/hunger-in-
america-2015-united-states-hunger-and-poverty-facts [https://perma.cc/6Q3X-V3M2]. 
 341. See SELECTED LONG-TERM CARE STATISTICS, FAMILY CAREGIVER 
ALLIANCE (Jan. 31, 2015), https://www.caregiver.org/selected-long-term-care-statistics 
[https://perma.cc/FPY6-G9U5]; see also Janice Shaw Crouse, The Loneliness of 
American Society, AM. SPECTATOR (May 18, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://spectator.org/ 
59230_loneliness-american-society [https://perma.cc/YNK7-DUXA].  
 342. See CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS: ENABLING A SMART AND CONNECTED 
WORLD, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/cyber-
physical [https://perma.cc/K9JQ-7SY9] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 343. U.S. PET OWNERSHIP STATISTICS, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (2012), 
https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/Statistics/Pages/Market-research-statistics-US-pet-
ownership.aspx [https://perma.cc/7NHU-LQ9S]. 
 344. See PETNET, http://www.petnet.io [https://perma.cc/5AUM-THUD] (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 345. See Liwei Wu, Pura: A Smart Water Fountain for Cats, INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/pura-a-smart-water-fountain-for-cats# [https:// 
perma.cc/6TBN-SFXX] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 346. See LITTER-ROBOT, https://www.litter-robot.com [https://perma.cc/ 
5S3V-D2YH] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 347. See TAILIO SMART HEALTH MONITOR, TAILIO, https://tailio.myshopify. 
com/products/talio-smart-health-monitor [https://perma.cc/N8NC-Z52H] (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2016). 
 348. See MOUSR, PETRONICS, http://www.petronics.io/#landing 
[https://perma.cc/637P-CHNS] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 349. See Jie Ma & Yuki Hagiwara, Will Drones Become the Toast of Napa?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2016, 12:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2016-02-18/in-napa-crop-dusting-drones-are-ready-for-takeoff [https:// 
perma.cc/5GMH-3LS4]. 
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vehicles,350 or ladders351—all of which do pose dangers. Identifying 
appropriate analytic boundaries352 is an important step toward 
understanding product liability’s effects on the societal costs and 
benefits of a particular technology. 
Like the world in which it operates, product liability law is far 
from perfect. These imperfections could advantage or disadvantage 
new technologies vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts. And 
these technologies, in turn, could mitigate or exacerbate those 
imperfections. These are problems to be explored. 
Those who conclude that these are also problems to be solved 
should proceed deliberately. They should assess whether the 
underlying challenges relate to liability exposure or to liability 
uncertainty; distinguish between reducing the costs of injury and 
merely shifting those costs; identify the negative externalities of 
today’s systems before assuming the positive externalities of 
tomorrow’s systems; and be wary of inadvertently placing new 
technologies on one side of old battle lines. Long after automated 
driving is a reality, these are the kinds of issues that humans will still 
be navigating.
 350. See David Morgan, Google Aims to Begin Drone Package Deliveries in 
2017, REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2015, 4:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
drones-alphabet-idUSKCN0SR20520151103 [https://perma.cc/G3QM-DEL7]. 
 351. See Bart Jansen, Insurers Adopt Drones for Airborne Inspections, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 31, 2016, 9:33 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/31/ 
insurers-adopt-drones-airborne-inspections/82434322/ [https://perma.cc/EU3Q-XGK4]. 
 352. See Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language,
supra note 54, at 78. 
